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1 Introduction 
The large-scale privatization of the public sector, liberalization of markets, and regulatory reform in Western 
society since the 1970s has led to the emergence of a new governance of markets that combines 
deregulation and re-regulation. This new mode of governance is known as the regulatory state. Utilities and 
other industries that are deemed to affect the public interest were removed from public ownership and 
placed in private hands. Specialized agencies were established to develop and enforce rules that governed 
the newly created markets. The agencies that received these new supervisory responsibilities were 
predominantly established as independent administrative authorities, which placed them outside the 
traditional, hierarchical control of central government. They have become commonly known as independent 
regulatory authorities (IRAs). The autonomy of these new intermediaries between private producers, 
consumers, and national governments has grown and the scope of their responsibilities has increased. 
They have become central actors in their own right in the governance of markets, and have spread across 
all Western European countries, regardless of their diverse political and economic backgrounds. The most 
prevalent are economic regulators, and specifically the national competition authorities (Majone, 1997; 
Majone, 1999; Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002; Thatcher, 2002a; Thatcher, 2002b; Coen & Thatcher, 2005). 
Where state intervention gave way, market forces gained influence. To safeguard the efficient 
organization of markets, competition policy became an increasingly important policy domain. The underlying 
assumption of competition policy is that undertakings in free markets can, unilaterally or in cooperation, 
behave in such a way that competition between undertakings is hindered. The result of this behaviour will 
lead to a decrease of consumer welfare. To prevent this detrimental behaviour from occurring, competition 
authorities are tasked with the enforcement of competition law. The European Union has taken up 
competition policy as one of the driving forces for the creation of the European single market. Under 
influence of the European Commission‟s Directorate General for Competition (then DGIV, now known as 
DG Comp) the interpretation of competition law became increasingly dominated by economic analysis; a 
tendency that has become known as “the economization” of competition law. A parallel development was 
the modernization and decentralization of competition policy with the introduction of Regulation 1/2003, 
which gave an important role to the national competition authorities (NCAs) in enforcing competition policy 
in the Member States (Doern, 1995; Wigger & Nölke, 2007; Buch-Hansen & Wigger, 2010; Lavrijssen, 
2010; Hyman & Kovacic, 2013; Wils, 2013). 
Another policy domain that has been taken up emphatically by the European Union and its Member
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States is the call for sustainable development. The idea of sustainability and sustainable development has 
been an increasingly relevant topic in policy development and governance ever since its rise to prominence 
following the 1987 UN-sponsored World Commission on Environment and Development report Our Common 
Future. Through the work of international research organizations such as the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, the threat of the human-produced enhanced greenhouse effect has become a central topic on 
national and international policy agendas. Notable examples include the Kyoto Protocol (signed in 1997), the 
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP-15) and the UN Climate Summit 2014. 
Since 1997, when it was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam, sustainable development has been a 
fundamental objective of EU policy (Mebratu, 1998; van Hees, 2014).  
In the confluence of these three trends – the emergence of independent regulatory authorities, the 
increased significance of (“economized”) competition policy, and the emphasis on sustainable development – 
lies the topic of this research. Certain sustainability initiatives have been found to be incompatible with the 
(economic) reasoning behind competition policy. There has been much discussion about how and to what 
extent the enforcement of competition policy can take into account such non-competition public interests as 
sustainability, animal welfare, and social welfare. Although the (legal) scholarly debate on this subject is quite 
extensive (Monti, 2002; Gehring, 2003; Gehring, 2006; Townley, 2009; Kingston, 2010; Lavrijssen, 2010; 
Ottervanger, 2010), it is unequivocally normative in its approach, focusing on the questions of how non-
competition interests can, could, or should be taken into account by competition law and authorities.  
1.1 Research question 
This study intends to offer an alternative to the legal-normative approach. While the latter is an interesting and 
important debate, it does not pay much attention to the realities that competition authorities face when interests 
of economic welfare and sustainable development collide. The aim of the research is to provide insight into the 
extent to which the competition authority shows responsiveness to the different interests and stakeholders as 
regards the issue of competition and sustainability. The research question is:  
What is the character of the responsiveness of the national competition authority as regards 
the issue of sustainability and competition? 
Creating institutions that provide responsiveness has been identified as one of the important challenges in 
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improving the democratic legitimacy of the EU and its bureaucracy (Yesilkagit, 2016; Follesdal & Hix, 2006).  
As the bureaucratic world becomes increasingly networked, responsiveness may offer the answer to the 
relative lack of clear accountability mechanisms (O'Toole, 1997). The lack of accountability of autonomous 
government bodies (such as the competition authority) has been criticized in particular.  Responsiveness, as a 
means of taking into account interests in the absence of external control, is therefore an important value for the 
competition authority.   
Competition authorities, like other economic regulators, operate in a complex arena with many different 
stakeholders (Hancher & Moran, 1989). Their actions and communications are judged by multiple audiences on 
the basis of many different and conflicting criteria (Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013). The relevance of the 
concept of responsiveness, as well as the research on the concept, is contingent on the recognition of the 
multifaceted character of responsiveness and the potential collision of conflicting interests and ethical 
obligations (Bryer, 2007). The issue of the assessment of sustainability initiatives under competition policy is an 
exemplary case where an autonomous government body is confronted with many radically different and 
conflicting interests and stakeholders. The study of the character of the responsiveness of the competition 
authority as regards this issue is therefore particularly suitable for a relevant agenda of responsive public 
administration. 
The in-depth, qualitative case study of a single national competition authority in a period where it has 
faced colliding interests of economic welfare and sustainable development will shed light on how and when 
these interests are taken into account, the considerations that play a role, and the arena in which these 
decisions are made. In this way, the study hopes to contribute to a fuller understanding of the issue of 
competition policy enforcement and sustainability interests, the responsiveness of the competition authority and 
the legitimacy of independent regulatory authorities.  
This study is an exploratory case study of the national competition authority in the Netherlands, the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). The case study has been conducted using 
qualitative methods, drawing on interviews with staff of the ACM and document analysis. In Chapter 2, the 
literature on independent regulatory authorities is reviewed more extensively, and connected to different 
theories of responsiveness. In Chapter 3, this theoretical framework is used to develop an appropriate research 
strategy and elaborate on the collection of data and the research methods. The analysis of the data is found in 
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Chapter 4. Part One of the analysis describes the initial formulation of the approach to the assessment of 
sustainability initiatives by the ACM, and how this approach was applied to two cases (the Energy Agreement 
and the Chicken of Tomorrow agreement). Part Two presents the events that followed these case 
assessments, and how they have led to a new approach. The final section of this chapter summarizes the 
findings and relates them to some of the theoretical points brought up earlier. Chapter 5, the last chapter of this 
thesis, presents a summary of the results and answers the research question by formulating four themes of 
responsiveness.  
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2 Theory 
The goal of this chapter is to explore the present knowledge of the responsiveness of competition authorities 
and to derive theoretical implications for the empirical analysis of this topic. In the first section I review the 
literature on responsiveness to clarify the concept and identify different elements that play a role in assessing 
the character of responsiveness. After answering the question of what responsiveness is, I turn to the study of 
independent regulatory authorities (IRAs), the institutional class in which competition authorities can be placed. 
The final section of this chapter sketches the theoretical framework for analysing the responsiveness of 
competition authorities by synthesising the elements that have been identified in the preceding two sections.  
2.1 Responsiveness 
In the study of public administration, responsiveness refers to the capacity of government to shape its 
behaviour according to the interests of its constituency. Defining the concept has shown to be tricky and has 
led to a large variety of results. First, I discuss the role of responsiveness in representative democracy. 
Responsiveness is a multifaceted concept and many of these facets have been studied separately. I make a 
distinction between political and bureaucratic responsiveness, and identify different types of response. I 
address the question of to whom the bureaucracy owes responsiveness, discussing political control, neutral 
competence, and bureaucratic values. I make the distinction between responding only to expressions of 
interests and responding on the basis of professional or expert knowledge of inherent interests. Finally, I 
investigate the implications of responsiveness for institutions that do not adhere to a strict politics-bureaucracy 
dichotomy. 
2.1.1 Responsiveness in representative democracy 
Responsiveness is a central concept in representative democracy. According to Pitkin, “a representative 
government must not merely be in control, not merely promote the public interest, but must also be responsive 
to the people” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 232). But what does it mean to be responsive? Responsiveness is not the same 
as continuously being reactive – responding – to expressions of preferences and interests (Eulau & Karps, 
1977). Rather, responsiveness refers to a continuous willingness to react. It is thus a systemic property of 
democratic institutions to ensure that “the principal‟s wishes must be potentially there and potentially relevant” 
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(Pitkin, 1967, p. 155). The responsiveness of the political system can be considered “a crucial test of 
democratic representation” (Saltzstein, 1985, p. 283).  
The act of responding can be considered to be composed of three elements: the respondent (or: the 
subject of response, that which responds), respondee (or: the object of response, that what is responded to), 
and the response (or: the content of the response). In the earliest studies of responsiveness the respondent 
that was considered was always an elected representative, a political actor, hence: political responsiveness. 
The focus of this scholarship is largely on the content or the form of the response.  
The simplest conception of responsiveness is one in which citizens articulate preferences which 
government translates into policy. The measure of responsiveness is thus equated to the congruence between 
the policy agenda and expressed interests (Verba & Nie, 1972). Additional components supplement this 
straightforward view of responsiveness. Eulau and Karps (1977) regard policy responsiveness (or 
“congruence”) as a component of responsiveness, to which they add service and allocation responsiveness. 
These refer to the attempts of the representative to attain benefits for their specific members or groups within 
their constituency, reactively (service responsiveness) or anticipatory (allocation responsiveness). The fourth 
component of responsiveness that they identify is symbolic responsiveness. This final addition refers to acts 
that do not have any substantive output, but serve only to establish and strengthen the relationship between 
the representative and its constituency. Eulau and Karps further clarify this last form of responsiveness with two 
examples: the new President‟s symbolic reassurance by “reach out” efforts – “walking down Pennsylvania 
Avenue after his inauguration, fire-side chats, telephonic call-a-thons, visits to economically stricken areas, 
being „Jimmy‟ Carter” (Eulau & Karps, 1977, p. 246); and the introduction of “thousands of bills” by all levels of 
government, which appears to be policy responsiveness, but in fact is symbolic because they “have not the 
slightest chance of ever being passed and, more often than not, are not intended to be passed” (Eulau & 
Karps, 1977, p. 247). According to Eulau and Karps, political responsiveness is the key to defining the 
representational relationship and only by analysing responsiveness in all its components can the complex 
nature of representation be understood.  
Schumaker defines responsiveness as “the relationship between the manifest or explicitly articulated 
demands and the corresponding actions of the political system” (Schumaker, 1975, p. 494). In conceptualizing 
responsiveness, Schumaker focuses on separating different degrees of responsiveness. In a progression of 
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least to most significant he distinguishes access responsiveness, agenda responsiveness, policy 
responsiveness, output responsiveness, and impact responsiveness. Access and agenda responsiveness refer 
to the willingness to hear concerns and place them on the agenda. Policy and output responsiveness indicate 
the degree to which demands are adopted in legislation or policy, and then effectively implemented. Impact 
responsiveness signifies “the degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in alleviating the 
grievances of protest groups” (Schumaker, 1975, p. 495). 
2.1.2 Political control and bureaucratic values 
Later, the notion of bureaucratic responsiveness came into view: the responsiveness of unelected government 
representatives. The second dimension of the notion of responsiveness is the respondee, the whom or what is 
responded to. The question of whom is responded to is problematic especially for bureaucrats. Elected 
politicians have a rather straightforward representative role. The whom of their responsiveness is their 
constituency as (a segment of) the electorate. For bureaucratic responsiveness, the whom-question has two 
possible answers, stemming from “competing views as to the primary source of administrative responsibility” 
(Saltzstein, 1985, pp. 300-301).  
The first approach is to regard the relationship between elected politicians and the bureaucracy. The 
chain of delegation starts with the election of a political representative who confers some more or less defined 
task to the bureaucracy. This delegational approach is associated with principal-agent theory. In the delegation 
of the task to the agent, a degree of discretion is created. The principal-agent approach focuses on analysing 
the cause and effect of the degree of discretion and how this can manifest itself as “policy drift”, wherein the 
outcome of the policy, as executed by the agent, is no longer fully in line with the intended outcome by the 
principal. Responsiveness in this approach is considered to be the responsiveness of bureaucrats to their 
political principals, and bureaucrats do not represent the public but serve as a “tool for use by elected 
representatives” (Saltzstein, 1985, p. 289).  
Bureaucratic responsiveness in some eyes has a fairly negative image. This is primarily related to the 
notion of responsiveness to political principals who in public perception are only concerned with their own 
(re)election (Vigoda, 2000). This perception has been substantiated in empirical work by Mortensen (2006). 
Another aspect of this negative connotation is that responsiveness can be understood as political bias (Stivers, 
1994). 
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Another approach, besides the delegational approach, is to understand the responsiveness of the 
bureaucracy as directly and independently to the public, rather than indirectly flowing from and to elected 
officials‟ representative obligations towards the public (Saltzstein, 1992). In public administration, there appears 
to be some tension between democratic accountability and administrative effectiveness. Practicing 
responsiveness can improve both accountability and effectiveness (Stivers, 1994). Responsiveness in this 
interpretation can serve as outward accountability to the public, rather than upward accountability to elected 
officials (Koppell, 2005). 
Responsiveness to the public introduces another matter in analysing responsiveness. The question is: 
should bureaucracy respond to only the expressed interests by the public, a view which requires and 
emphasizes participatory aspects of the democratic process, or some inherent or “real” interest of the public? 
The latter, scholars argue, is justifiable on grounds of the expertise of bureaucrats, professionalism, or neutral 
competence. Sharp notes that perhaps “responsiveness does not consist of a correspondence between policy 
maker priorities and those of the public, but rather a willingness to strike some balance between professional 
standards and values and community priorities” (Sharp, 1981, p. 44). Sharp criticizes the “consumer” model of 
responsiveness, in which citizen preferences, demands, or more generally, “public opinion” is the focus of the 
responsiveness relationship. The criticism is based on the tension between professional judgement of needs 
and policy based on citizen preferences. Sharp argues for a synthesis of the “preference satisfaction” approach 
with the “professional judgement of needs” approach, hinged on the extent to which the agency (in her case the 
police department) succeeds in solving the problems that face the community. The synthesis is provided 
through a process of “mutual learning”, consisting of the tempering of professional judgments with the 
consideration of citizen preferences and the sharing of these judgments with citizens. 
The arguments for professionalism or neutral competence are not without criticism. One of the criticisms 
is that professionals are inclined to exaggerate the value of their expertise and define matters of contention 
narrowly, to increase the relevance of their expertise (Stone, 1980). A more optimistic view of professionalism 
in bureaucracy argues that a professional bureaucrat is actually quite inclined to operate in line with the public 
interest. Five reasons for this are given by Kearny and Sinha: “First, professional and organizational values and 
goals do not necessarily conflict. Also, members of a profession do not hold homogeneous values. Third, the 
professional bureaucracies are representative of broader society. Fourth, there is no monopoly on specialized 
knowledge and expertise. Finally, there are numerous political checks on bureaucratic activities” (Kearney & 
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Sinha, 1988, p. 576). This sentiment is, at least partially, echoed and confirmed in empirical research by Meier 
and O‟Toole (2006). Rather than making use of the principal-agent framework, this research argues for 
interpreting bureaucratic responsiveness within the framework of representative bureaucracy. Following in the 
footsteps of Robert Dahl (1970), who argued for the primacy of the bureaucratic values as inner check on 
administrative behaviour, it is argued that inherent bureaucratic values are more powerful and more relevant 
than analysing bureaucratic behaviour through the lens of political control (Meier & O'Toole, 2006).  
In the United States, neutral competence has long been considered the explanatory factor for the 
democratic legitimacy of the unelected bureaucracy. However, building on the work of Moe (1985) it has since 
been argued that, for the Senate as well as the White House, the neutrality of the bureaucracy has been to a 
large extent outpaced by responsiveness to the (elected) political principal (Rourke, 1992; West, 2005). 
Another line of research that is particular to the American context has led to a fruitful empirical analysis of 
bureaucratic responsiveness to external influences. The role of public notice and comment in rulemaking has 
nuanced the views on the effects of political control and bureaucratic responsiveness. Whereas earlier studies 
into the control of U.S. bureaucracy tend to emphasize the role of Congress and the President, rulemaking has 
been shown to be influenced directly by interests groups, rather than only indirectly through Congress (Yackee, 
2005). The empirical analysis of negotiated rule-making shows that although increased bureaucratic 
responsiveness does occur this does not necessarily make the process fairer, because responsiveness is 
stronger to interests that are supported by those with more resources (Langbein, 2002). In a similar vein, it has 
been pointed out that the formalization of the procedural accountability of the rulemaking process may have the 
ironic effect of a less responsive bureaucracy. A more relaxed approach would give the agencies more freedom 
to solicit outside views and make significant changes in proposed rules (West, 2004).  
An effort of conceptualizing a comprehensive typology of responsiveness on the basis of expressed or 
inherent interests is put forward by Severs (2010). Severs describes the tension between Pitkin‟s (1967) and 
Saward‟s (2006) understanding of representation, and argues for the reintroduction of responsiveness, thus 
restoring the concept of representation from “claiming to speak for” to the multi-directional relationship between 
the representative and the constituency. Her typology focuses on the level of congruence between the 
response and the interests, and the locus of judgement. Severs distinguishes two loci of judgement: ex fundo 
judgement originates from preferences expressed by citizens (a posteriori responsiveness); ex alto judgement 
stems from political ideas or perspectives that have been developed by the representatives themselves. The 
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second axis on which Severs locates responsiveness is the level of congruence, which is divided into issue 
congruence (selective responsiveness), issue and interest congruence (realised responsiveness), and no 
congruence (non-realised).  
2.1.3 Beyond bureaucratic responsiveness 
Up to this point the politics-bureaucracy dichotomy has been presented as unambiguous. However, new modes 
of governance have gained centrality in current democracies and certain government agencies no longer fit the 
traditional description of bureaucracy and draw on alternate sources of legitimacy. How does this relate to the 
responsiveness of such organizations?  
As Ostrom (1975) noted, responsiveness is subject to constraining decision-making rules that depend 
upon the institutional arrangement. The independence from political control has the paradoxical effect of on the 
one hand diminishing legitimacy by removing vertical accountability to political principals, while on the other 
hand providing legitimacy by improving the impartiality of the decision-making process. Other forms of 
constraints on behaviour, such as professional norms, also shape responsiveness (Kearney & Sinha, 1988). 
Brouard and Guinaudeau (2015) show that even in highly professionalized and technical domains, public 
opinion can influence policy-making, although they focus on the mediation of this process through party politics. 
Shifts in governance are generally associated with a loss of responsiveness of traditional political 
institutions (van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004; Føllesdal, 2011). To demonstrate credible commitment, 
politicians may opt for regulatory systems in which the political responsiveness is sacrificed. However, the 
regulatory institutions have shown still to be responsive to political actors (Christensen & Yesilkagit, 2006). 
Whereas independence points to the lack of formal requirements for responsiveness, it appears that 
independent regulators actively search for strategies to increase their quality and legitimacy through 
responsiveness (Lonsdale, 2008). Responsiveness to external stakeholders and citizens does not need to be 
passive, but can be actively shaped by the organization to control political dynamics and increase legitimacy 
(Yang & Callahan, 2007). This can include strategic behaviour to keep a low public profile, or symbolic acts of 
responsiveness (Alon-Barkat & Gilad, 2016). 
Bryer (2007) identifies six variants of responsiveness by deriving them from three potentially competing 
ethical perspectives on the nature of public administration. To understand responsiveness within the context of 
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increasingly networked governance, all variants must be considered and possible conflicts explicated. Control-
centred ethics produces dictated responsiveness, in which bureaucrats respond to elected officials as their 
political principals, and constrained responsiveness, in which “administrative thought and action is restricted 
and shaped by bureaucratic rules, norms, structures, or cultures” (Bryer, 2007, p. 485). The two variants of 
responsiveness that are derived from discretionary ethics are purposive responsiveness, in which 
administrator-defined goals are the primary object of response, and entrepreneurial responsiveness, where 
citizens are responded to individually and as customers. Collaborative responsiveness stems from deliberative 
ethics and emphasizes responses to stakeholder consensus. Negotiated responsiveness combines all three 
ethical perspectives and actively addresses multiple and conflicting demands that are imposed by the different 
ethics. 
2.2 Independent regulatory authorities 
The responsiveness of public institutions that do not correspond to the traditional notion of bureaucratic 
characteristics is contingent on the exact nature of those institutions. In this section the nature of the 
competition authority as an independent regulatory authority (IRA) is examined. First, I describe the historical 
background of IRAs and some of the characteristics of different IRAs. Then, I survey several approaches to 
explaining the different sources from which IRAs derive their legitimacy in a democracy.  
2.2.1 The nature of IRAs 
The first instance of an independent authority in a democratic country is found in the United States, where in 
the 1880s the need to regulate the railroads and end discriminatory pricing practices started a social 
movement. The rush to fill the power vacuum, at the end of the Civil War, caused large scale partisan political 
corruption. Besides the political argument for reform, Rosanvallon identifies three other arguments, specific to 
the railroad sector: (1) the need for a high level of expertise, (2) the need for a flexible system, capable of 
evolving alongside technological development, and (3) a capacity for arbitrage (Rosanvallon, 2011, pp. 77-78). 
These arguments are still applicable to many of the existing independent authorities.  
As the development of the bureaucracy in the United States was considerably behind that of the 
European governments, the call for regulation had to find an answer in new institutions. The creation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission was the result. The ICC became the model for several new agencies 
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created in the United States, such as the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1934. Despite the consistently contingent character of each of their origins, ultimately they 
represent “a novel system for expressing and managing the general interest” (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 79). 
Outside the United States these novel organisations were not yet to be found. Regulatory legislation did 
not play a role of significance in the political economy of the Keynesian welfare state that dominated Europe 
since 1945. Utilities were generally state-owned. Industrial policy prevailed over economic regulation (Coen & 
Thatcher, 2005). At the same time, social regulation, such as environmental and consumer protection, was not 
politically significant in comparison to traditional social policy (Majone, 1999). This mode of governance, in 
which the state intervenes as planner and producer of (public) goods, is known as “the positive state”. The shift 
from the positive state to the regulatory state initiated the introduction of the independent regulatory authority in 
Europe (Majone, 1997).  
Competition authorities, as the object of academic research, can be placed in the broader institutional 
class of “independent regulatory authorities” (IRAs), also known as “independent regulatory agencies”, 
“national regulatory authorities”, or “non-majoritarian regulators” (Coen & Thatcher, 2005). Broadening the 
institutional class further, IRAs fit in the class of “non-majoritarian institutions” or “quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations”. In the Netherlands, this type of governmental organization is named an 
“independent administrative body” (zelfstandig bestuursorgaan, ZBO), which is a legally defined entity.1 
Literature that specifically relates to the non-representative characteristics of IRAs (i.e. being institutions that 
play a vital role in representative democracy yet not being representative in the traditional chain of electorate-
politicians-bureaucracy), refers to such institutions as “unelected bodies” (Vibert, 2007) or “independent 
authorities” (Rosanvallon, 2011). 
 The three ideal types of IRAs are competition authorities, sectoral regulators, and regulators that 
“secure or advance societal desiderata in certain domains, or throughout the entire market sector” (van Veen, 
2014, p. 39), or “social regulation” (Majone, 1997). IRAs are considered to hold three different types of power: 
legislative powers, executive powers, and judicial powers (van Veen, 2014, p. 39). These powers can be used 
ex ante (regulatory) or ex post (supervisory). Generally, IRAs possess a combination of these powers. Most 
                                                        
1
 Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen [Framework Act on independent administrative bodies], Article 1, defines it as “een 
bestuursorgaan van de centrale overheid dat bij de wet, krachtens de wet bij algemene maatregel van bestuur of krachtens de wet 
bij ministeriële regeling met openbaar gezag is bekleed, en dat niet hiërarchisch ondergeschikt is aan een minister” [an 
administrative body of central government that is vested with public authority by act of parliament, pursuant to an act of parliament 
by order in Council, or pursuant to an act of parliament by ministerial decree, and that is not hierarchically subordinate to a minister”. 
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IRAs also have overlapping responsibilities. For example, a much found combinatory type of IRAs is the 
competition authority that also has a mandate for consumer protection (e.g., the Competition and Markets 
Authority in the United Kingdom, the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, and the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Commission of Ireland). In recent years, a trend has emerged of merging agencies and 
creating new combinations of regulatory and supervisory responsibilities (Ottow, 2014). 
2.2.2 The legitimacy of IRAs 
Traditional approaches to the democratic legitimacy of institutions encounter problems explaining the sources 
of legitimacy of IRAs. Van Veen recognizes three approaches to the legitimacy of IRAs: the “technocratic” 
approach, the “delegation” approach, and the “relational” approach (2014, pp. 22-25).  
In the “technocratic” approach, IRAs receive their legitimacy based on the quality and efficiency of their 
activities. The complex economic or technical areas in which IRAs operate require expertise that neither the 
bureaucracy nor politicians possess sufficiently. Their independence allows them to achieve policy goals which 
political and bureaucratic institutions cannot achieve because of the “self-interest and short-termism of elected 
politicians, and outside lobby influences” (van Veen, 2014, p. 22). According to Vibert, unelected bodies 
represent a new branch of government that takes away a portion of the agenda of the political arena and 
demotivates active participation in politics. It does not only diminish the content of politics but also the 
importance of politicians. IRAs have an inherent advantage over politicians in dealing with empirical knowledge. 
This provides them with their legitimacy as collectors and analysts of information. Unelected bodies are in an 
advantageous position to deal with the empirical components of public policy. Elected bodies choose the 
values to be reflected in public policy (Vibert, 2007). In the technocratic approach, therefore, democratic 
legitimacy corresponds to the legitimacy of “output” over “input” (Scholten, 2015). 
In the “delegation” approach, IRAs are considered within a traditional framework of representative 
democracy. The chain of delegation, from voters to parliament to government to bureaucracy, is extended to 
include the autonomous bodies. In research on this delegation of authority, the dominant theoretical framework 
is the “principal-agent” theory (Coen & Thatcher, 2005; Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002; Thatcher, 2002b; Wilks 
& Bartle, 2002). This approach focuses on the degree of autonomy of the agent and methods of accountability 
to its principal.  
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In the “relational” approach, the object of research is the relation of the IRA not only with politics, but 
rather their environment at large, referred to as the “regulatory space” (Hancher & Moran, 1989). This includes 
political institutions, but also the judiciary, other government bodies, transnational networks, (regulated) 
industry, and the general public. The degree to which IRAs are accountable to this wider environment is 
considered an additional source of legitimacy (Majone, 1999; Maggetti, 2010). Accountability takes many forms 
and can involve many different actors (Bovens, 2007; Bovens, 2010). This corresponds to the “governance 
turn” in political-administrative research, which emphasizes the role of non-public actors in policy-making 
networks (Papadopoulos, 2010; Zeitlin, 2013; de Visser, 2009; Papadopoulos, 2011). 
The three approaches call on a number of sources for explaining the legitimation of IRAs. The 
independence of these institutions can be said to be the main cause of the legitimacy problem, because their 
autonomy places them outside the chain of representation, and delegation and accountability. At the same time 
it is their independence that gives them their right to exist. The independence of IRAs is a two-fold 
independence, both from politics and from industry (Barkow, 2010; Aelen & Biezeveld, 2013; Hyman & 
Kovacic, 2013; Italianer, 2014). A distinction is made between de jure independence, which is formal and 
institutionalized (Lavrijssen & Ottow, 2012; Monti, 2014), and de facto independence, which relates to the 
actual way that regulators operate (Maggetti, 2007). In his monograph Democratic Legitimacy (2011), 
Rosanvallon distinguishes impartiality as a separate characteristic from independence. Active impartiality, he 
argues, does not aim to eliminate conflicts of ideas and interests, but is based on the necessity, in a 
democracy, to ensure fair treatment of all individuals.  
Accountability conflicts with the idea of independence. Accountability has three main features: 
information, justification, and punishment or compensation (Schedler, 1999, p. 17). Providing information and 
justification is not necessarily in conflict with the independence of institutions, but the punishment (or 
compensation) feature seems to be incompatible with the nature of independence (Biela & Papadopoulos, 
2014; Bovens, 2007; Bovens, 2010; Maggetti, 2010). 
Strictly electoral-representative democracies relied on the status of institutions, rather than their quality. 
This has changed. Power has come to depend more on quality than on status (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 97). Most 
unelected bodies operate in complex economic or technical areas (Vibert, 2007; van Veen, 2014). As such it is 
their perceived competence, or expertise, in these complex matters that gives them another source of 
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legitimacy (Schrefler, 2010; Schrefler, 2011). 
2.3 Responsiveness of the competition authority 
Responsiveness is an essential component of democracy. The overall responsiveness of the democracy can 
be separated into specific elements, distinguishing between the responsiveness of unelected and of elected 
representatives. There are two fundamentally different approaches to the accountability of bureaucrats: 
accountability to political principals or accountability to the public. Bureaucratic values play an important role in 
understanding the responsiveness of the bureaucracy. To assess responsiveness empirically, it has to be 
explicitly examined in all its, possibly contradictory and competing, facets. When the question is to whom the 
unelected decision maker is responsive, not only the political principal must be accounted for, but also the 
interests of the public and external stakeholders. The interests to be taken into account are expressed interests 
and preferences, as well as the “real” or “inherent” interests that the respondent identifies, for example on the 
basis of professional knowledge. The form of the response must also be considered carefully. The response 
can be substantive or symbolic, or there may be a strategic use of nonresponse. The responsiveness can be 
measured on various points in the process of policy, from access to the policy making process to the actual 
impact of the policy on the interest concerned. The next step is to relate these findings to the specific nature of 
the competition authority and its position in a democracy, its relationship to the political arena, and its sources 
of legitimacy.  
There are various elements of responsiveness that must be considered. These can be ordered into two 
dimensions of responsiveness. The first dimension, which we might call the input, is related to the question: to 
what is the relevant agent responding? To elucidate the second dimension, or the output, we ask the question: 
what is the response? Further developing these two dimensions can give us the necessary tools to assess the 
responsiveness of the competition authority as regards the issue of sustainability in competition policy 
enforcement.  
2.3.1 The input dimension of responsiveness 
To get a clear perspective on the input dimension of responsiveness it is necessary to address a number of 
different aspects related to this dimension. The input dimension of responsiveness is primarily concerned not 
with the response itself, but with to what is being responded. That means that the behaviour (e.g., an 
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expression of interest) or nature (e.g., “inherent” interests or other characteristics) under scrutiny is external to 
the competition authority. In the case of politicians who respond to the electorate, it concerns the behaviour or 
nature of the constituency. In the case of IRAs, this term might be replaced with the concept of the regulatory 
space (Hancher & Moran, 1989). A different way of looking at the input dimension of responsiveness is to take 
into account the possibility that the agent shows responsiveness based on a perceived interest that is 
formulated from within the competition authority (ex alto) instead of an expressed interest (ex fundo). This 
perspective focuses on the internal values and goals of the competition authority, rather than the person or 
institutions to which is being responded.  
2.3.2 The output dimension of responsiveness 
The elements of responsiveness that are part of the output dimension are related to the nature of the response. 
A very basic distinction could be made between responses that are of a substantive nature or purely symbolic. 
Symbolic responses serve the purpose of strengthening the relationship between the competition authority and 
the person or institution to which is responded. A more nuanced approach to the nature of the response is 
found in Schumaker‟s (1975) concept of the degrees of significance of responsiveness. For the purpose of our 
case study this approach can be adapted to suit the various stages of the decision-making process of the 
competition authority. The competition authority has various stages in which it might show responsiveness: in 
the formation of general policy or guidelines, in its decision whether to investigate certain behaviour 
(prioritization), during the assessment of the behaviour, and in the communication of the authority‟s actions and 
considerations. In each of these four stages there are possibilities for more substantive or more symbolic 
responsiveness. The impact of the responsiveness is most directly felt by the parties under investigation in the 
assessment stage of the competition authority. Similarly, responsiveness in the prioritization stage and the 
formation of policy and guidelines can be reasonably expected to be of considerable influence on the impact on 
consumer welfare. The competition authority‟s communication is more likely to be of a symbolic nature. 
Responsiveness in this area is, on the whole, further removed from impact responsiveness, the most significant 
degree of responsiveness.  
2.3.3 Reflection on the research question 
The research question of this study is: What is the character of the responsiveness of the national competition 
authority as regards the issue of sustainability and competition? Taking into account all the considerations and 
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observations of this chapter, it is possible to refine this question and describe the different elements of the 
character of responsiveness. Responsiveness of the competition authority can occur in four different stages: 
policy formation, prioritization, the assessment of competition cases, and communication. The responsiveness 
of the competition authority can be formed by the multiple stakeholders and their interests, which makes up the 
regulatory space of the competition authority, and the responsiveness of the competition authority can be 
formed by professional values, goals and guidelines.  
The character of the responsiveness of the competition authority towards sustainability interests can only 
be fully understood when all the different elements of responsiveness are considered. The different elements 
are structured along the output dimension and the input dimension. Neither the dimensions, nor their elements, 
should be considered in isolation. Only the combination of the different elements and dimensions can 
accumulate to a full understanding of the character of responsiveness. For example, substantive 
responsiveness towards the Ministry might be shown during the formation of general policy by the competition 
authority, or symbolic responsiveness might be practiced towards interest groups in the competition authority‟s 
external communication. When different elements of responsiveness are combined it becomes apparent how 
the idea of responsive authority can be problematic. Different stakeholders and different values and goals of 
the competition authority clash. Showing responsiveness in one area might necessitate a lesser degree of 
responsiveness in another. Thus, the competition authority is presented with dilemmas of responsiveness. In 
this study these dilemmas will be identified and the outcome of the approach chosen by the competition 
authority of this case study will be presented. In the analysis of the data, this study will come across several 
forms of responsiveness, each with their distinct set of responsiveness elements. In the choices and 
considerations for responding to conflicting interests and competing ethical obligations lies the character of the 
responsiveness of the competition authority.  
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3 Research Strategy 
3.1 Scope and relevance 
The goal of this study is to assess the character of the responsiveness of a national competition authority as 
regards the issue of sustainability. The choice to focus on a particular aspect of the responsiveness, rather than 
the overall responsiveness, has several reasons. First of all, it narrows the scope of the research topic. Given 
the limitations of the researcher in respect to time and resources, this can improve the quality and depth of the 
research. Secondly, an approach focused on the issue of sustainability increases the relevance of the 
research. In the field of competition law and economics, the question of the assessment of sustainability 
initiatives by competition authorities has become an important arena for debate by scholars and practitioners. 
However, the debate has not been the object of much practical or empirical research. The body of research has 
been dominated by normative legal argumentations. That this issue might have implications for the legitimacy 
of the competition authority has been identified (Gerbrandy, 2015a), but a more detailed analysis has not been 
undertaken and possible further consequences have not been reported. In public administration literature, the 
topic of the legitimacy of independent regulatory authorities in general has received considerable attention, but 
not so much in relation to competition authorities and the issue of sustainability. The research for this thesis 
has been undertaken to contribute to both these research fields by conducting an in-depth case study of a 
national competition authority facing the competition assessment of sustainability initiatives. 
The choice for this approach also has positive implications for the relevance of this research to the study 
of (bureaucratic) responsiveness in general. As has been shown in the literature review, the multifaceted 
character of responsiveness has been emphasized in previous research. It is there where the potentially 
competing interests and ethical obligations intersect, that the study of responsiveness has the most relevance 
(Bryer, 2007). It can be expected that the intersection of competing interests and ethical obligations is most 
explicitly visible in situations or cases where the competition authority not only takes into account the 
elementary interests of competition policy, but also is confronted with other interests.  
3.2 Case selection 
The national competition authority (NCA) will be analysed as a single case study. The competition authority that 
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has been selected is the NCA of the Netherlands: the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets 
(ACM). As the researcher is based in the Netherlands, this gives the advantage of familiarity with the history 
and context of the selected case. Furthermore, the researcher has a particular history with the ACM as a 
student intern at the Policy and Communications Department, between November 2015 and May 2016. This 
has provided the researcher with a favourable position to interview staff members as well as upper 
management, access to policy documents, and general immersion in the cultural and administrative-political 
context of the research object.  
The ACM has been involved in two competition assessments of sustainability initiatives: the Energy 
Agreement and the Chicken of Tomorrow agreement. This provides a substantive argument, which 
complements the practical advantages, for selecting the ACM as the case study. The two assessments and 
their outcome have proven to be controversial, spurring debate between competition experts, in the political 
arena, and in society at large about the responsibilities and duties of the competition authority in taking into 
account sustainability interests in the enforcement of competition policy. The fact that the ACM has been 
involved in these particular competition assessments justifies the case selection.  
Despite the significance of these assessments for this study, it is intended to be more than a 
comparative multi-case analysis of the two competition cases. The reasoning is threefold. First of all, case law 
and EU regulation have established practices of confidentiality of information about the individual assessment 
of competition cases to ensure the independence and impartiality of NCAs (Regulation No 1/2003). In light of 
the sensitive nature of the specifics of the assessment procedures and methods, it may be challenging to attain 
in-depth information about the assessment of individual cases. Secondly, widening the scope of the research to 
include non-case specific data may lead to a more complete grasp of the dynamic and multifaceted nature of 
responsiveness to this issue. Finally, during one of the first phases of the research some sort of breakthrough 
occurred. A week before the first interviews were scheduled to take place, the Minister of Economic Affairs 
announced new legislation (see Section 4.2). Many of the respondents had been involved in some way with the 
proposal of the Minister. This made the new developments, which were only distantly related to the specific 
competition cases, an important topic during the interviews. 
3.3 Data collection 
The emphasis in this study is on understanding, rather than explaining, the responsiveness of the ACM towards 
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multiple, different and potentially competing interests and ethics. In this sense the underlying logic of inquiry is 
more akin to an interpretive, rather than a positivist, methodological stance (Haverland & Yanow, 2012). This 
has implications for choosing the appropriate data sources and research methods. Interpretive science 
emphasizes contextualized meaning making and gaining “access to the conceptual world in which our subjects 
live” (Geertz, 1973, p. 24, cited in Haverland & Yanow, 2012, p. 404). Concepts are more likely to be in the 
form of themes and motifs, than in the form of distinct variables (Neuman, 2007, pp. 88-89) .  
To strengthen the contextualization and conceptual correspondence with the research subject, the 
primary sources of data for this study originate from the ACM. The responsiveness of the ACM will be 
characterized on the basis of interviews with ACM staff and document analysis. The staff interviewed have 
been carefully selected beforehand to mitigate threats to inference. Together with a senior staff member of the 
ACM (the internship supervisor of the researcher), a list of nine appropriate interview candidates to be 
approached was drafted; another two interview candidates were added to the selection on the recommendation 
of other interviewees. All eleven interview candidates were approached via e-mail between 13 June 2016 and 1 
July 2016 and all positively responded to the request. The respondents were selected on the basis of horizontal 
and vertical differentiation and their involvement with the research topic. Three respondents work in the 
Strategy and Communications Department, four respondents work in the Competition Department, one 
respondent works in the Office of the Chief Economist, one respondent works in the Legal Department, and two 
respondents are Board Members. Besides the two Board Members, the selection includes three Directors and 
six (senior) staff members (for an overview, see Appendix A). The interviews took place between 4 July 2016 
and 13 July 2016 at the ACM offices. All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the researcher, using the 
ATLAS.ti software. All respondents were sent an interview report and agreed on the use of the material for 
quotes on condition of anonymity. The interviews were done in Dutch and translated by the researcher for the 
incorporation in this study. The interviews were semi-structured (for a model interview guide, see Appendix B).  
Documents are used to gather information to support the insights that have been gained from the 
interviews. Most of the documents are sourced from the official website of the ACM. These documents can be 
divided into two categories: policy documents that give an impression of the general strategy and concerns of 
the ACM, and case-specific documents, such as decisions and communications (e.g. press releases) regarding 
decisions or analyses. Internal documents were used to clarify details in the timeline. Other sources include 
parliamentary proceedings, documents from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the European Commission, 
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and newspaper articles.  
3.4 Operationalization 
The character of the responsiveness of the ACM is analysed along the input dimension and the output 
dimension. The input dimension corresponds to the question: to whom and what is responded? The output 
dimension corresponds to the question: what is the form of the response? 
3.4.1 Input dimension 
The input dimension distinguishes two types of responsiveness: responsiveness to actors or stakeholders in 
the regulatory space of the competition authority and responsiveness to rules and norms that make up the 
values and mandate of the civil servants of the competition authority as professional bureaucrats. All the 
elements of the input dimension of responsiveness that are described below will be scrutinized in the analysis 
of the data.  
Regulatory space 
Businesses are stakeholders of the competition authority. In regard to the regulatory space of the competition 
authority it is vital to keep in mind an important distinction between competition authorities and some other 
authorities, like sectoral regulators. Competition authorities have a mandate to enforce general competition 
among businesses in all possible sectors. Sectoral regulators have a much more clearly defined regulatory 
domain. This means that the “constituency” of the competition authority is more fruitfully interpreted to include 
businesses in general, rather than a specific subset of companies in a particular sector. With regard to other 
participants in the regulatory space, there is not such an important distinction to be made between sectoral 
regulators and the competition authority.  
Parliament is one of several political players in the regulatory space of the competition authority. The 
ultimate primacy of policy lies with the legislative function of Parliament. Positive law is based on European 
guidelines, which include the independence requirements for the ACM. There is no arranged relationship or 
regular contact between the ACM and Parliament. Sporadically, ACM staff is invited to partake in informational 
“round table” discussions.  
The Ministry of Economic Affairs is another important political stakeholder in the regulatory space of 
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the competition authority. Most of the activities of the ACM fall under the policy domain of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, including competition policy. The ACM‟s regulatory activities in the transport sector are the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. The two ministries cover the vast majority of 
the ministerial involvement with the ACM. Only rarely would another ministry be involved. An example could be 
the involvement of the Ministry of Finance as shareholder of state-owned enterprises. The ACM is an 
independent administrative body. Legally, the ACM consists of its three Board Members only, who are 
appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs. The ACM does not hold any own funds. Its budget falls within 
the overall budget of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Its staff is formally employed by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, but “provisioned” for the services of the ACM. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for 
competition policy, as well as policy regarding consumer protection and regulation of the energy, 
telecommunications and postal sector. As such, the relationship with the Ministry of Economic Affairs is one in 
which the ACM is solely responsible for handling cases. The Ministry is not supposed to involve itself with 
individual cases, but only indicates general policy guidelines (Vegter & Maandag, 2015).  
The European Commission has the primary authority to enforce competition policy within the European 
Union. In the context of European national competition authorities the role of transnational actors is particularly 
relevant because of the immense influence of the European Union and its Commission on the topic of 
competition policy. Competition law is laid out in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Much of the enforcement responsibility is delegated to the competent national 
authorities, pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition (also known as 
the “modernization regulation”. The Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp) is an authoritative source 
for the interpretation of competition law (which is formalized in Community law and implemented in national 
laws). 
The ACM maintains relationships with many international fellow competition authorities. Besides 
bilateral relationships, the most prominent associations of multilateral connections with other competition 
authorities are within the International Competition Network (ICN) and the European Competition Network 
(ECN). The ICN is an informal network of competition agencies which focuses on the dissemination of 
information and expertise of competition enforcement. There are more than a hundred competition agencies in 
the ICN (ICN, 2009). The ECN consists of the national competition agencies of all EU Member States plus the 
Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission. The main reason for creating the ECN was 
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the allocation of cases and sharing of information, but the function has evolved during its existence. The ECN 
now also serves as a policy network, discussing how to ensure convergent policy among the NCA‟s and how to 
best address recurring issues in competition enforcement (Monti, 2014). 
Relevant interest groups for the competition authority include employers‟ organizations and consumer 
organizations. In regards to the topic of sustainable development, it is expected to also include into the relevant 
interest groups such interest groups as environmental organizations and animal welfare organizations.  
Professional and bureaucratic values and goals 
The stakeholders of the competition authority that make up the regulatory space form but one aspect of the 
input dimension of responsiveness. Competition authorities act on the basis of their legal mandate as enforcer 
of competition laws, but have discretion in the interpretation and execution of these laws. This discretion is not 
practiced at random but informed by goals and standards that they have set individually or as a group, e.g. 
bureaucratic values (Meier & O'Toole, 2006) or other professional guidelines (Kearney & Sinha, 1988). This 
purposive responsiveness often conflicts with responsiveness to political principals (Bryer, 2007).  
Bureaucratic values can be viewed as a counterweight to political control. The values are internal 
compasses of the bureaucratic organization and the individual bureaucrat, as opposed to the external guiding 
by political principals. The competence of the bureaucrat at the ACM could be related to its output: the 
effectiveness of serving its goals related to consumer welfare. The bureaucratic values also reflect the input, or 
procedural aspect of the organization and its staff. In the mission statement of the ACM we find the 
bureaucratic values which are considered to be central to the organization: openness, professionalism, and 
independence (ACM, 2014a).    
For competition authorities the fundamental goal that underlies their work is the protection or 
improvement of consumer welfare. The efficiency of economic markets for the benefit of consumers is a core 
aim of competition policy in the EU (Monti, 2002). As such, the ACM and its staff also regard it as one of their 
central goals as professionals. Serving this purpose of guardians of the consumer welfare is more abstract than 
the idea of responding to consumers as individuals or customers (cf. Bryer, 2007). Rather, this purpose can be 
regarded as an administrator-defined goal that is the result of the interpretation of competition policy and law. 
The consumer as an individual does not appear as a “customer” of the services of the competition authority, but 
24 
 
his interest is represented in the goals of competition policy and the professional standard of competition 
experts. The interest of the consumer, i.e. the optimization of consumer welfare, and the way in which this 
translates to rules and procedures for the operations of the competition authority, is established through highly 
developed economic conceptualizations (Lavrijssen, 2010).  
As an organization, the ACM does not have any evident ties with sustainability interests. Nonetheless, 
these interests can play a role in several ways. Sustainability issues can steer the type of competition cases 
that come under investigation. More specifically, sustainability interests can be taken up as efficiency benefits 
that negate the anticompetitive effects of the behaviour that is investigated. The issue of sustainability is also a 
central concern of the primary political principal of the ACM, the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  
3.4.2 Output dimension 
The separate elements of the output dimension of responsiveness are less conspicuous in the data. The output 
dimension concerns the behaviour that results from the responsiveness of the ACM. Two different types of 
elements of output dimension can be distinguished. The first type is the specific stage in the decision-making 
process in which responsiveness is shown. For the competition authority four relevant stages of decision-
making are distinguished: the formation of general policy, such as guidelines or strategy documents; the 
decision whether to start an investigation of a certain practice or agreement, in other words, the prioritization of 
competition cases; the assessment of individual competition cases; and the external communication of the 
competition authority.  
The second type of elements of the output dimension is the measure or degree of responsiveness: 
symbolic responsiveness, agenda responsiveness, and impact responsiveness. To some extent there is an 
overlap between these two types of the output elements of responsiveness. For example, symbolic 
responsiveness will be naturally associated with the communication stage. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to 
separate the stages in which responsiveness occurs and the degree of responsiveness, because it is not 
necessarily the case that, to stick with the earlier example, no substantive goals can be achieved through 
communicative efforts. 
Symbolic responsiveness occurs when the purpose of responsiveness is not substantive (i.e. it does not 
serve the interests of the pertinent input element of responsiveness), but (only) to establish or strengthen the 
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relationship between the respondent and the respondee. For example, an external communication effort of the 
competition authority might ostensibly create more room for sustainability initiatives under competition policy, 
but in actuality might not constitute any substantial change in the assessment of sustainability initiatives. This 
example of responsiveness does not serve the substantive goal of sustainability, but could enhance the 
relationship between the competition authority and interest groups.  
Agenda responsiveness occurs when the response entails putting certain interests on the (policy) 
agenda of the organization. This response does not necessarily translate into immediate achieving of the goals 
of the respondee, but it does open up a path to the possibility of such an achievement. In the case of the 
competition authority there is a very tangible of the organization‟s agenda, namely its prioritization policy. The 
competition authority has substantial room for discretion in its enforcement of competition law as far as 
prioritizing certain types of potential anticompetitive practices. If the competition authority were to emphasize or 
deemphasize the assessment of sustainability initiatives this has the potential of resulting in more or less 
prohibitions of these practices. However, this result is still contingent on the actual outcome of the assessment.  
Impact responsiveness is the ultimate form of responsiveness, wherein the expressed or perceived 
interests of the respondee are materialized through a change of behaviour of the respondent.  
 
3.5 Method of analysis 
The approach to the analysis of the data is exploratory and qualitative. The first step that was undertaken to 
structure the data collected from the interviews, was to order it chronologically. By doing this, the timeline of 
events would become clearer, making it possible to identify where responsiveness occurred or changed 
following the events that fall within the scope of this study. Where relevant, segments of the interview 
transcripts were coded according to their correspondence with the different segments on the timeline: the 
development of guidelines during the first period of the existence of the ACM (Section 4.1.1), the two individual 
case assessments (Section 4.1.2), and the process of amending the approach to the assessment of 
sustainability initiatives (Section 4.2).  
The (bureaucratic) responsiveness literature has shown that there are many ways to approach the 
subject. In Section 2.3, different elements of responsiveness have been organized along the input dimension 
26 
 
and the output dimension. The input dimension includes elements of responsiveness concerning to what is 
responded and to whom is responded. The output dimension recognizes a difference between symbolic 
responsiveness, which serve to establish or strengthen the relationship between the respondent and the 
respondee, and substantive responsiveness. The output dimension also distinguishes between the separate 
stages of decision-making in which the competition authority may show responsiveness: in its decision whether 
or not to investigate certain behaviour (prioritization), during the assessment of the behaviour, in the 
communication of the authority‟s actions and considerations, and in the formation of general policy and 
guidelines.  
After cleaning up the timeline of events, the next step was to identify the different elements of 
responsiveness on the input dimension. The data was coded in accordance with to whom (the respondee, e.g., 
the Minister of Economic Affairs, the European Commission, or interest groups) and to what is responded 
(where applicable, a distinction was made between responsiveness to expressed interests and responsiveness 
to interests that were perceived to be inherent on the basis of the ACM‟s own judgement [e.g. on the basis of 
expert knowledge]). The last part of the coding of the data was to identify the elements related to the output 
dimension, the characteristics of the (non-)response itself. Responsiveness was coded as being more symbolic 
or more substantive, and the stage of decision-making at which the responsiveness was shown was 
determined. 
In the iterative process of analysing and coding the interview data, a number of configurations of the 
different elements of responsiveness (see above, Section 3.4) manifested itself more prominently than others. 
The combinations of configurations that were indicated to be problematic by the respondents (some of which 
were already identified in Section 2.3.3 and other sections of Chapter 2) illustrate the dilemmas of 
responsiveness that the competition authority faces as regards the issue of sustainability interests and 
competition enforcement. In the concluding chapter of this study, these dilemmas of responsiveness are 
synthesised in themes of responsiveness (Section 5.1). 
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4 Analysis  
The analysis of the empirical results that have been collected is presented in two parts, which also follow each 
other chronologically. Part One highlights the experiences of the investigation by the ACM of two cases of 
sustainability initiatives: the Energy Agreement and the Chicken of Tomorrow. Part Two of the analysis 
describes how, following these two cases, the ACM and the Ministry of Economic Affairs engaged with each 
other to revise the approach to assessing such sustainability initiatives under competition law. In Section 4.3 
the findings are summarized and related to the literature as reviewed in Chapter 2 and the operationalization of 
the input and output dimension of responsiveness as discussed in Chapter 3. 
4.1 Case History (Part One): The assessment of sustainability initiatives 
4.1.1 Guidelines for the assessment of sustainability initiatives 
The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is a relatively young agency that was created on 
1 April 2013 as a merger between three previously existing authorities: the Netherlands Competition Authority 
(NMa), the Netherlands Consumers Authority (CA), and the Netherlands Independent Post and 
Telecommunication Authority (OPTA). The creation of the ACM was part of a cost-cutting programme by the 
Dutch government, as it was felt that by combining the different agencies into one a more efficient agency 
could be achieved (Cabinet-Rutte I, 2011).  
In the earliest period of its existence, the ACM published a number of documents in which it showcased 
its views on the topic of sustainability and competition policy. On 12 March 2013, shortly before the creation of 
the ACM, its predecessor NMa published a memorandum on “The assessment of anticompetitive practices as 
a result of sustainability initiatives in practice” (ACM, 2013d). The NMa memorandum had already set out some 
guidelines on the interpretation of competition policy in light of sustainability initiatives. A parliamentary debate 
spurred the ACM to develop the framework further. Later, that document was replaced by the Vision Document 
Competition & Sustainability, initially in draft format for consultation in July 2013 (ACM, 2013a) and the final 
version in May 2014 (ACM, 2014b). The Vision Document was closely linked to the Policy Rule on Competition 
and Sustainability of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. The aforementioned parliamentary debate was the 
motivation for the Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereafter: the Ministry) to write its Policy Rule, which was also 
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put up for consultation in July 2013 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2013) and finalized in May 2014 (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2014). In the Strategy Document (ACM, 2014a), which was initially published in September 
2013 and later amended following the ACM Streamlining Act of 1 August 2014, the topic of sustainability is 
addressed as one of the recognized public interests. Furthermore, the options for cooperation between 
businesses in this area are demonstrated on the Knowledge Bank on Sustainability on the ACM‟s website 
(ACM, 2013c). 
Formulating the ACM strategy and the agenda, on which public interests and the issue of sustainability 
were placed prominently, was not an enterprise that was undertaken in isolation from the outside world. During 
the period preceding the merger, a strategy team was formed composed of employees of the three 
organizations that were to merge.
2
 The strategy team consulted with prominent public figures on the approach 
that the new agency should take. One of the notions to emerge from the consultations was the wish that the 
ACM would explicitly engage with public interests (R5). 
The Strategy Document reveals that the topic was considered an important issue on the young agency‟s 
agenda. In the Strategy Document, how to deal with the “different public interests that play a role” in the areas 
relevant to the ACM is identified as “one of the important questions” (ACM, 2014a, p. 6). The public interests 
that have been designated by the legislation are indicated as forming the starting point for this question. Being 
a multifunctional authority (responsible not only for competition policy enforcement, but also regulation and 
consumer protection) these include “well-functioning markets, optimal regulation of statutory or natural 
monopolies, and consumer protection” (ibid). In the section that follows, the topic of public interests and 
competition is discussed. Here it is acknowledged that “a free-market system can sometimes have adverse 
effects, for example on the environment” (idem, p.7). Arrangements between undertakings that have desirable 
positive effects and also result in negative effects will be assessed as to the “necessity, proportionality and 
effectiveness of such arrangements” (ibid).  
The guidelines that are developed in the Vision Document are the result of the independent elaboration 
of the prevailing views of the ACM. Although the Vision Document and the Policy Rule are clearly closely 
related to each other, the Vision Document is viewed as a self-contained product of the ACM. One of the 
respondents stressed that  
                                                        
2
 For more about the merger procedure, see Ottow (2014); Yesilkagit (2014); and Fonteijn (2016). 
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“the Vision Document was created by us, independently. There was some dialogue with the 
Ministry, but that was only in clearing up some of the margins. The Policy Rule was made by 
the Ministry” (R3).  
The Vision Document was intended to give more clarity on the perspective of the ACM on the room for 
sustainability under the cartel prohibition. This is contrasted by one of the respondents with the Ministry‟s 
motivation, which was two-sided:  
“The motivation for the Ministry to pick up the issue of sustainability was a request from 
Parliament, which was also linked to the revenue model of the agricultural sector. That is 
another example of the hidden agenda that often is involved” (R2). 
The Ministry defends multiple interests, and that includes the producers‟ interests. The content of the Vision 
Document should not be viewed as a step towards being more permissive towards sustainability initiatives. As 
pointed out by Pijnacker Hordijk (2013), the Vision Document of the ACM does not pay any substantive 
attention to the possibility of exempting sustainability initiatives from the first paragraph of Article 101 TFEU 
(the notion of “ancillary restraints”, also known as the Wouters doctrine).3 Some competition experts consider 
this doctrine to be a legitimate approach to widening the possibilities for sustainability initiatives to be exempted 
from competition law. One of the respondents recalled that “[the Board] chose to follow the cautious line” (R2), 
rather than to interpret competition law in a more reformist but uncertain way. The Vision Document makes a 
reference to the Wouters doctrine, but it does not go further than stating that “the ACM believes [the Wouters 
doctrine] has been insufficiently explored yet in the case law in order to be able to make statements on its 
application in this Vision Document” (ACM, 2014b, p. 10).  
4.1.2 Putting the guidelines to the test in two cases 
The Energy Agreement 
In the second half of 2013 the first big test of the policy on sustainability initiatives crossed the path of the ACM. 
                                                        
3
 Art. 101(3) TFEU lists cumulative conditions for possible pro-competitive benefits (commonly known as “efficiencies”) to balance 
anti-competitive effects: efficiency gains; fair share for consumers; indispensability of the restrictions; no elimination of competition. 
This “efficiency defence” is the approach employed by the ACM in the assessment of sustainability initiatives. According to some 
lawyers, it is possible to exempt sustainability initiatives from competition policy on other grounds: the ancillary restraints doctrine. In 
this defence, based on the Wouters case law, it is claimed that the restrictions on competition caused by an agreement are ancillary 
to achieving the goal of the agreement. Therefore, it is argued, the restrictions on competition are not subject to Art. 101(1) TFEU, 
regardless of any further consideration of the conditions of possible efficiencies. For a discussion of the applicability of the Wouters 
doctrine to sustainability initiatives see e.g., Kloosterhuis (2016) and Gerbrandy (2015b). 
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In late 2012 the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER) had taken the first steps in bringing 
together a large group of stakeholders to form the foundation for the Agreement on Energy for Sustainable 
Growth. The newly formed Cabinet-Rutte II soon committed itself to the Energy Agreement and the 
negotiations on its terms continued well into 2013. The Energy Agreement was a large and diverse set of 
agreements that together would need to achieve, among others, targets of energy savings and an increased 
share of electricity from renewable energy sources. One of the measures that was agreed upon to accomplish 
these goals was to expedite the closing of five coal-fired power plants, which together contributed to 
approximately ten per cent of the electricity generation capacity in the Netherlands at that time. It was 
stipulated that this agreement was dependent upon the approval by the ACM (SER, 2013, p. 97).  
The ACM had several reasons to decide to investigate the Energy Agreement. As an independent 
administrative body it is free to choose its own prioritization. In its prioritization the ACM prioritizes larger cases 
over smaller cases, and the Energy Agreement was a large case. The agreement to shut down ten per cent of 
the electricity generation capacity in the Netherlands has such significant potential implications that the case 
could not be ignored. According to one of the respondents “we couldn’t not do it on the grounds that it was an 
unimportant case, because ten per cent is not a small thing” (R2). The ACM was aware of the large societal 
impact that their decision in this case could have. One of the respondents says: “The ACM was brand new and 
this was the first really large big decision with a great societal impact. That is something that everybody was 
aware of” (R6). The decision to investigate this case was partly informed by their professional values and 
guidelines. The probability that the agreement to jointly reduce a rather significant proportion of generation 
capacity is an infringement of the principles of competition policy was apparent to the competition experts at the 
ACM from the start. Furthermore, the case was perceived as a possibility for the ACM to showcase an 
implementation of the new Vision Document Competition & Sustainability. The primary goal of the Vision 
Document is to give guidance to businesses on the nuances of competition policy with respect to sustainability 
initiatives. The analysis of the Energy Agreement would serve as an example of the guidelines in a real world 
case. 
The conclusion of the ACM analysis was that “the benefits of the agreement would insufficiently outweigh 
the negative effects for Dutch electricity consumers”, and therefore it is “likely” that the agreement would fall 
within the scope of the relevant competition laws (ACM, 2013b). The fact that this outcome would lead to 
political turmoil had been recognized by the ACM. There had been some suggestions from within the ACM to 
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employ different approaches to the analysis of the case. One of the respondents revealed that his initial sense 
was to apply a broader social cost-benefit analysis, but he since had “become convinced that that is not what 
you should do as competition authority” (R11). One of the arguments in the internal discussion on which 
approach to take was to achieve a more politically favourable outcome. Another respondent recalled that  
“we looked at the case from many different perspectives, to see if it wasn‟t possible to do it 
differently. (…) Not everybody was convinced, and not everybody thought this outcome was 
desirable” (R9).  
In the end the conclusions were that taking a different approach would probably not lead to a different outcome, 
but would decrease the soundness of the analysis: “A matter of increasing insights, also for me” (R2). 
The technical analysis of the Energy Agreement has strong support within the ACM. The area of 
renewable resources, electricity generation and associated effects, like the emission of potentially toxic 
substances, is a well-studied topic in the context of economic analysis. The application of these studies to the 
specific context of the Energy Agreement is a reason for the confidence in the quality of the assessment that 
was done by the ACM. One of the respondents explained:  
“With the Energy Agreement we had the luck that there has been much research on this, so 
there was much information available from renowned institutions. This allowed is to do our 
analysis very well” (R5).  
For certain parts of the analysis, “the further sophistication of the calculation” (R2), the expertise in this domain 
was provided by the Energy research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN, 2013). For other information there was 
also regular contact with civil servants at the Ministry. It is clear that in the actual assessment of the case, the 
only considerations that play a role are technical elements and the goal of doing the analysis as good as 
possible according to professional standards. One of the respondents described it as follows: “You only have 
techno-analytical concerns; politics no longer plays a role. (…) You don’t stress certain aspects; you just try to 
work according to the state of the art” (R2). 
The stakeholders and interest groups that were a part of the Energy Agreement were informed about the 
conclusion of the analysis in a meeting at the ACM offices. In this meeting the parties were explained how 
competition law works, how and why the ACM did their analysis, and the outcome of that analysis. These 
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stakeholders reacted rather mildly, “some were disappointed, others less” (R2) and “nobody could disagree 
with the explanation” (R5). The response that followed in the political arena and in the press was more 
outspoken. There was a common perception, outside of the ACM, that the benefits of other parts of the Energy 
Agreement could balance the consequences of closing down the coal-fired power plants, and that the ACM had 
failed to take this into account. Within the ACM this perception is viewed as flawed. The reception of the 
outcome of the Energy Agreement assessment shows the first signs of a rift between the ACM and the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. One of the respondents thought that the ACM assessment had grieved the Ministry: “This 
misperception was a part of the discontent of the Ministry, the idea that we had not taken into account all the 
benefits. By doing so we had antagonized them very much” (R2). 
The Chicken of Tomorrow 
Since the beginning of 2013, the Dutch poultry industry had been faced with public protests against the living 
conditions of chickens raised for meat consumption. In February 2013 it was announced that agreements had 
been made with the umbrella organization of supermarkets in the Netherlands about the improvement of living 
conditions, realized by 2020, for chickens raised for the Dutch market, under the name “Chicken of Tomorrow”. 
These agreements had come to the attention of the ACM and mid-2014 an investigation was started. 
One of the reasons for the ACM to start the investigation was to provide an example of how the 
sustainability aspects of competition cases can and should be analysed by parties themselves, in their self-
assessment. There was still uncertainty with entrepreneurs, which held them back in introducing sustainability 
initiatives. By way of a second case assessment, the aim was to “give more guidance” (R2). One of the 
respondents stated that  
“Our approach was to provide clarity about what businesses may and may not do under 
competition law, regarding sustainability initiatives. Apparently there was a lot of uncertainty 
which led to a gut feeling saying: „We are not going to undertake any action because it will not 
be allowed by the ACM‟” (R1).  
The goal of the Vision Document and the Policy Rule was to make clear that competition law provides sufficient 
room to allow sustainability initiatives. The outcome of the assessment of the Energy Agreement did not 
contribute to this goal. With the investigation of the Chicken of Tomorrow, it was hoped that the outcome would 
support that goal and that the ACM would be able to “communicate a positive story” (R1). Much like the Energy 
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Agreement, the Chicken of Tomorrow initiative was heavily publicized by the parties. As such, the ACM was 
aware of the existence of the initiative. One of the respondents recalled:  
“We thought they might come to us to have a conversation or ask for an opinion, but they 
didn‟t, so we were a bit suspicious” (R11).  
As the parties did not approach the ACM for an opinion on competition aspects of their agreement, the ACM 
decided to pick up the investigation on its own initiative.  
For the assessment of the Energy Agreement there was a substantial amount of economic research that 
could be drawn upon for the formulation of an economic analysis of the case at hand. The analysis of animal 
welfare provided something of a challenge in this respect. One of the respondents compared the assessment 
of the Chicken of Tomorrow to the Energy Agreement and said that “for animal welfare it is very difficult” to do a 
good analysis (R5). The method for measuring the value of a certain degree of improvement in the living 
conditions was not evident. However, with the use of a willingness-to-pay (WTP) analysis, the ACM found a 
technique which they were confident to implement in their argumentation. One of the respondents explained 
this method: “What we did was that we took something elusive like animal welfare, and measured the value 
that the consumer attaches to it” (R1).  
As the investigation progressed and it became apparent that the outcome was likely going to result in a 
negative decision, the parties were contacted to evaluate the option of changing the Chicken of Tomorrow 
agreement to fall within the boundaries what competition policy allows. Since the first meeting in November 
2014 there was an on-going conversation between the ACM and the parties, who did not agree with the WTP 
analysis that was done. To strengthen the confidence in the economic analysis that was being done, the WTP 
analysis was reviewed by the Economic Bureau. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was also being kept up to 
date. Although not a party to the agreements, the Ministry had supported the Chicken of Tomorrow initiative 
and more in general had shown itself an eager advocate of self-regulation within industry to achieve 
sustainability targets. The Ministry was informed that the ACM had the case under investigation. One of the 
respondents indicated that once the Ministry had been informed of the investigation, they continuously kept 
themselves informed of the status of the investigation. At the experts level the Ministry was being kept up to 
date to see how the ACM was conducting the analysis. This could be useful information for the Ministry in their 
support and cooperation with future initiatives. The experts were sympathetic to the analysis by the ACM. The 
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views at the political level in the Ministry were different, as the outcome was considered to be acceptable. The 
respondent explained:  
“But at that time, when we had just started, we didn‟t know yet what the outcome would be, on 
the contrary: there was a hope we would be able to give the go ahead. And the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs definitely had the same hope. Although they were not an official party to the 
agreement, they had a very clear interest. That meant there was quite some pressure from the 
Ministry. We even went to the Ministry to give an extra explanation of how we came to our 
conclusions. That is quite unusual and indicates the seriousness [of the matter]. De facto you 
can say that there was pressure. But such is life for the ACM. You retain your independence” 
(R1).  
This analysis revealed a disparity between the value that consumers attributed to the improved animal welfare 
and the increase in price. This disproportionality between the increase in price and the value attached to the 
improved animal welfare was the foremost reason for the ACM to conclude that this agreement would not 
receive approval on grounds of competition policy. One of the respondents stated that “[i]f we would have had 
the impression that the effect on animal welfare was substantially higher, the decision might very well have 
been different” (R10). In January 2015 the ACM concluded their investigation and informed the parties and the 
Ministry of the final outcome of the assessment. The analysis was published (ACM, 2015). The analysis refers 
to the Vision Document and explains that the Chicken of Tomorrow analysis was done to set an example for 
self-assessment of sustainability initiatives. The conclusion of the analysis is that the agreements would lead to 
a restriction of competition that could not be justified under the exception criteria.  
4.1.3 Communicating the assessment of sustainability initiatives 
In the communication of the Energy Agreement analysis, the ACM was focused on explaining and justifying the 
technical aspects of the analysis. Only in hindsight was there a realization that this approach was not 
appropriate. The evaluation of the assessment of the Energy Agreement did not lead to any direct alterations of 
the ACM policy or substantive changes in the way of analysing cases. It did lead to a “realization of the 
consequences of our decisions” (R3). The political sensitivities of the case had been recognized early on and 
according to a respondent there was an awareness that “we had no friends” (R5). Communicating the 
complexities of the case was difficult and this “tarnished the public image” of the ACM, as one of the 
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respondents said: “For the general public the story was too nuanced and complicated. What remained was an 
image of the ACM as an impediment to sustainability initiatives” (R11). The technical approach that was taken 
in the communication was not, in hindsight, the best approach according to the respondents, one of whom said:  
“We were too focused on the technicalities, whereas we could have just said: „The consumer 
has not been involved in the negotiations and this is a bad deal for consumers‟. We could 
have been more assertive in that respect” (R6). 
The technical tone of the communication is exemplified by a column by one of the Board Members in the daily 
business newspaper about a month after the publication of the assessment. In this article the assessment was 
justified on the basis of legal and economic nuances in competition policy, and the word “consumer” was not 
mentioned (Don, 2013). 
The negative image that had resulted from the Energy Agreement assessment influenced the approach 
to the Chicken of Tomorrow agreement. First of all, the hope that this initiative would be approved was one of 
the reasons to decide to investigate the case, as one of the respondents explained:  
“We would rather have seen the outcome to be that the agreement could be allowed, but 
unfortunately it wasn‟t. At that moment we had some regrets. If we had known the outcome, 
we might not have picked up the case” (R11).  
Another sign of the influence of the Energy Agreement assessment on the approach to the Chicken of 
Tomorrow agreement was that more attention was paid to the communicative aspects of the case assessment. 
One of the respondents indicated that when it was recognized that the outcome of the assessment of the 
Chicken of Tomorrow agreement would point to a „no‟, the Strategy and Communication Department was 
included to discuss the question “how to sell the ‘no’ in the right way, given the societal pressure in this issue” 
(R6). Nonetheless, also with the Chicken of Tomorrow there were problematic aspects in the communication. 
The first reason for this lies in the method that was employed in the assessment. The willingness-to-pay 
analysis was not only an uncommon method for the competition experts, but it was also problematic for the 
communication to the non-professionals. This opened the ACM up to a lot of unnecessary criticism, according 
to one of the respondents:  
“I think everybody here was convinced the agreement was excessive. But we chose the 
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difficult way of telling that to the outside world. The story was too complicated and it was too 
easy to paint a negative picture of us” (R9). 
The conflict between competition interests and other public interests, such as sustainability, put the ACM in a 
difficult spot. The mandate of the enforcement of the competition laws limits the ACM in the decisions they 
make. Since the Energy Agreement and the Chicken of Tomorrow, the realization has been that 
communication is vital in the handling of this conflict. One of the respondents described it as follows:  
“Public interests are usually not our core business, but that of another institution. That means 
that an important aspect of our organisation is communication and sensing how society values 
public interests and how we should relate to that. But that does not necessarily mean that you 
have to do things differently. It also has to do with the way in which you communicate, so that 
people recognize that you have seen things from their perspective” (R7). 
The relevant concern in taking into account public interests such as sustainability in the enforcement of 
competition law is whether the ACM has the authority to assign value to public interests other than competition 
interests. The assessment of the Chicken of Tomorrow and the Energy Agreement shows that the ACM 
adheres to its mandate and professional standards. One of the respondents explained that this approach is 
problematic:  
“In both cases we established that the [sustainability] goal was undisputed, but the way to 
achieve that goal was expensive and could be smarter. Due to the way it was arranged in 
legislation we were forced to say „no‟, and society did not accept that, because they agree with 
the goal. They accept that we can say when it is unnecessarily expensive, but they don‟t 
accept that we then say „no‟” (R7).  
The only instrument that the ACM has to try to mitigate this problem is in its communication, as indicated by 
another respondent:  
“The trick is to show the outside world the connection. That is not always easy, because you 
have to explain your assessment framework, which has a very economic-legal background, in 
language that people recognize. So I see it as a communication problem” (R11).  
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The external communication has the task of explaining how and why the ACM does what it does. The 
respondents indicated that the message they have to bring across can be difficult. The focus on communication 
is therefore a continuous and fundamental aspect of the work of a competition authority. However the conflict 
between different public interests has implications for other institutions as well. One of the respondents 
explained that the Ministry of Economic Affairs has similar concerns as the ACM:  
“We have to find the right way of telling the story continuously, balance it, because it is not that 
we only stand for competition interests. We can and want to take into account other public 
interests as well, but to do so requires that the public interest is clearly defined. (…) We see 
the Ministry struggling with their message. (…) I think the Ministry has difficulties in their 
message on the bigger picture of the conflict between free market policy and other interests. 
With other Ministries you see that they can identify with one interest and represent their 
stakeholders. The free market doesn‟t have such clear stakeholders” (R9).  
This dilemma within the Ministry played a role in the assessment of the two sustainability initiatives and 
continued to be influential in the events that followed. 
 
4.2 Case History (Part Two): Adjusting the approach to sustainability initiatives 
4.2.1 A new Policy Rule 
The publication of the analysis of the Chicken of Tomorrow decision caused a stir in the media and in politics. 
The outcome of the Chicken of Tomorrow analysis led to some “discomfort” within the Ministry, as one of the 
respondents described it (R2). In a parliamentary debate, the Minister stated he would have preferred a 
different outcome. This public statement by the Minister was recognized by the ACM as a relevant expression 
of interest by an important stakeholder. The ACM did not show any responsiveness to this signal. One 
respondent explained: “I think it is important to be aware of the opinions in politics, but this has never impacted 
the decision making. Actually, this is exactly the reaction we had expected” (R10). The Minister‟s statement 
was not perceived as a reason to modify the ACM policy. To the extent that the ACM had the intention of being 
responsive to the Minister‟s interest, it felt it was already incorporated in its enforcement of competition policy. 
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Following the publication of the ACM analysis of the Chicken of Tomorrow, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs has stated his intent to change the Policy Rule Competition and Sustainability to allow for more room for 
sustainability initiatives. According to one of the respondents, this intention of the Minister is not really 
compatible with the principles of competition policy:  
“The Ministry is used to making policy and steering behaviour into a certain direction, also in 
sustainability policy. But competition policy is not about steering behaviour, it is about setting 
boundaries within which there is freedom. Telling companies how they should behave is 
something for the Ministry. We can‟t tell companies exactly what they should do, because then 
you don‟t have a free market. We can only assess behaviour ex post” (R9).  
This also illustrates that there is a feeling that the ACM is limited in its responsiveness due to the nature of 
competition policy. The responsiveness to sustainability issues is limited to those stages of the decision-making 
where strict standards of competition policy do not necessarily or explicitly dictate the response by the ACM. 
The tendency of the Ministry of changing behaviour by imposing rules is a fundamentally different method from 
what the ACM is able and willing to practice. As competition authority it is restricted to using its executive 
powers ex post. This is not only because of the institutional restrictions created by legislation and the formal 
position of the regarding its legal mandate, but it is also an attitude inherent to competition theory.  
One of the steps that the Minister took in the exploration of expanding the room for sustainability 
initiatives, was to ask for Commissioner Vestager‟s interpretation of the scope for sustainability in relation to 
competition issues and the opportunities to reduce the tension between the two (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2015). Although the Minister‟s letter included two full pages explaining his rationale and concerns, the 
Commissioner‟s answer was brief (European Commission, 2015). The Ministry contacted the European 
Commission to try to put this topic on the agenda for one of the meetings of the European Council during the 
Netherlands European Union Presidency. This proposal was rejected by the European Commission. Instead 
the topic was addressed during one of the meetings of European Competition Network. In April 2016, the ACM 
delegation gave a presentation on the topic for their fellow competition authorities. The responses surprised the 
ACM delegation. In the countries where sustainability is an important topic, they found out, the issues are 
solved through legislation. And when there are problems that the competition authority faces, the steps they 
take are different from how the ACM had acted. One of the respondents interpreted the way other competition 
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authorities handle these situations:  
“They try to avoid the issue and redirect the issue back to the government, because the 
competition authorities are of the opinion that they are not able to undertake such a balancing 
of interests” (R3).  
The debate on the compatibility of competition policy and sustainability appears to be largely confined to the 
Netherlands. Nonetheless, there is an international component to it, first of all because the European 
Commission has been involved in the issues in the Netherlands, and secondly because the ACM has sought 
attention for it in international forums. As a respondent explained, this is motivated by the wish to review the 
procedures with their professional peers:  
“We try to discuss these issues internationally. No one else has done what we have done, 
analyse a case in this way, technically. Internationally there is much more interest for the 
technical aspect” (R2).  
But despite their interest in these cases they do not recognize the existence of the same issues in their 
countries. The lack of similar cases in other Member States can be attributed to several causes. Other 
competition authorities seem to be more inclined to simply fall in line with their political principals, as was 
described by one of the respondents:  
“In many countries it seems that it is not done to be so out of line with your own government, 
or the competition authority is just not willing to mix competition and the environment” (R2).  
Another explanation lies in some of the specific characteristics of Dutch society. The “polder model” of 
consensus-based decision-making has turned into a government policy of leaving as much as possible to the 
market to solve at their own initiative, which according to a respondent  
“is asking for problems with competition law. This combined with the exceptional attention to 
sustainability and animal welfare. International fellow competition authorities barely recognize 
these issues. The European Commission understands it better, also because there are some 
Dutch there who know how things work here” (R11).  
Among several of the respondents there was a sense that the ACM has put the relationship with the Ministry to 
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the test to an extent that would not have occurred in other countries, although it is also felt that it is important 
that the relationship is maintained. They characterized this attitude as an example of independence.  
In December 2015 the Ministry of Economic Affairs published a draft version of the new Policy Rule 
Competition and Sustainability for consultation. The draft included several adjustments to the old Policy Rule 
and would result in an ambitiously progressive interpretation of European competition law. The ACM and the 
European Commission were invited to give a response to the draft Policy Rule, and they did. In general there 
had been a lot of contact between the ACM and the Ministry on the topic of sustainability. On the director and 
board level the consensus is that the ACM was closely involved with the Ministry in the development of the new 
Policy Rule (R7, R8, R9, R11). One of the respondents highlighted that even when there is a difference of 
opinion between the Ministry and the ACM, the cooperation remains productive and the confidence in a mutual 
understanding as the outcome is high:  
“We have continuous communication with the Ministry. They make the rules of course, but it is 
customary that we advise and give input. After all, we are in the end responsible for 
enforcement. This [Policy Rule] was a big theme, so we had a rather intensive dialogue. In the 
end they decide what they write down and then they made the Policy Rule public for 
consultation. We decided not to respond publically [but in private communication]. That was 
because we were of a very different opinion, and sometimes it is best not to show that, 
especially if you are sure that you will reach an agreement” (R8).  
On the expert level within the ACM, the perception seems to put less emphasis on the cooperative aspects of 
this process. According to one of the respondents, the change to the Policy Rule illustrates that the interests of 
the ACM and the Ministry have diverged: “We understand each other, but find it difficult to agree” (R2). Another 
respondent stated:  
“The Ministry drafted a first version of the new Policy Rule and that was made public for 
consultation. We were informed of the drafting, but there was not much contact. We were 
informed, so was the European Commission, and we were asked to give our opinion in the 
consultation period. And that is what we did, and so did the European Commission” (R3).  
The overall picture here seems to be more one of the ACM giving a matter-of-fact advice or opinion, rather than 
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an intensive cooperation between parties.  
The official response from the ACM to the draft Policy Rule dates to 18 February 2016 (ACM, 2016). In 
the response, the ACM indicates that the draft has not incorporated the concerns and suggestions that the 
ACM had advanced in earlier conversations with the Ministry. Therefore, the concerns and suggestions are 
reiterated. In its conclusion the ACM recommends not to amend the Policy Rule as proposed in the new draft 
version. The response further states that the implementation of the draft version of the Policy Rule could lead to 
a situation in which the competition authority would be forced to judge specific cases on the basis of European 
rules which are stricter and allow only for a narrower interpretation of the law than the Policy Rule would 
suggest. This situation would actually increase the uncertainty for undertakings hoping to commit themselves to 
a sustainability initiative, whereas the intention of the Policy Rule is to achieve the opposite.  
The response by the European Commission raises similar concerns (European Commission, 2016). For 
the respondents it was clear that the European Commission‟s response, together with that from the ACM, was 
decisive for the fate of the Policy Rule. On this matter the ACM and the European Commission held the same 
view, but this does not translate to a complete agreement on all the preceding decisions by the ACM. As one of 
the respondents said:  
“The European Commission was resolute in their response to the Policy Rule and put a halt to 
it. In that sense they are on our side, but they think we have opened Pandora´s box which they 
would rather have left closed” (R2).  
There is some ambiguity in the European Commission‟s stance on the ACM‟s approach to the issue, which can 
also be discerned with regard to the assessment of the individual cases. One of the respondents explained that 
some of the elements of the assessments done by the ACM are controversial:  
“We know the opinion of the Commission. They think we went quite far in investigating the 
Energy Agreement. They like the outcome, of course, but they think our reasoning was 
somewhat liberal. They would have been a little more conservative in what you take into 
account in your assessment” (R11).  
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4.2.2 A new approach to the prioritization of sustainability initiatives 
It appears that the responses by the ACM and the European Commission to the consultation have indeed had 
a significant influence on the Minister‟s intentions. When asked how the development of the position of the 
Ministry towards the issue of competition policy and sustainability can be described, one of the respondents 
stated:  
“I observe that indeed there is a change at the Ministry. They had the ambition to make such 
agreements as the Chicken of Tomorrow permissible, to put it a bit bluntly. If you compare the 
consultation document of half a year ago to what has come out now, you see that it has 
changed. It is fair to conclude that the Ministry has listened to the ACM and the European 
Commission. Less is possible than the Ministry wants” (R1).  
The outcome of the consultation process regarding the proposed amendment of the Policy Rule has been 
made public by way of a letter from the Minister to Parliament (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016). In this letter 
the Minister summarizes the responses from the consultation period, including the criticisms from the European 
Commission and the ACM. In light of these criticisms, three measures are announced:  
i. a limited amendment to the policy rule,  
ii. legislation that facilitates sustainability initiatives through general rules and regulation, and  
iii. further discussion with the European Commission on the limitations of competition law.  
Furthermore, the Minister writes that the ACM will also take certain measures in light of the proposed new 
legislation. The Minister reports that 
“[the ACM] assumes that broadly supported sustainability initiatives, where the Ministry, 
businesses, as well as consumers have been involved (and are positive), that those initiatives 
have no harmful effects on the consumers. In such cases the ACM will only take action when it 
receives a signal or a complaint. If the initiative is indeed determined to be harmful the ACM 
will not immediately enforce, but will first get in touch with the parties with the aim of 
eliminating the harmful effects of the agreement. The ACM will publish on this separately. 
Additionally, the ACM has let me know that in light of the outcome of the recent evaluation 
they will focus on increasing communication directed at businesses that make agreements 
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with the aim of improving sustainability.” 
Similarly, the ACM policy of assessing sustainability initiatives under competition law has also changed. The 
outcome of the process of amending the Policy Rule has not only been that the Ministry has listened to the 
ACM and the European Commission, but the ACM has also listened to the Ministry. A respondent explained 
the intentions by saying: “In anticipation of the Minister’s plans, we are not going to act against initiatives that 
are in the spirit of the new legislation” (R3). The commitments that the Minister describes in the letter to 
Parliament contain two elements. The first element is a different approach to the prioritization of cases 
concerning sustainability initiatives. The second element is an additional effort in improving communication.  
The prioritization of the ACM is based on the perceived impact on consumer welfare. In the Energy 
Agreement and the Chicken of Tomorrow cases a number of other reasons are given for deciding to start an 
investigation. The first is to give guidance to businesses in their self-assessment. The second reason, in the 
Chicken of Tomorrow, has been to show that competition policy is not necessarily restrictive in cases 
concerning sustainability benefits. This latter reason has its justification not only in improving the perception of 
competition policy, but also in improving the image of the ACM as the enforcer of this policy. The new approach 
to prioritization of sustainability cases adds a new element to these considerations. One of the respondents 
explained that “[o]ur starting point is always to solve a problem, a significant problem, even if there are no 
complaints” (R7). Establishing the significance of the problem was the ACM‟s responsibility, but with the new 
approach a part of this responsibility has been given away. One respondent explained that this creates a new 
distinction in qualifying behaviour from the perspective of competition enforcement:  
“The advantage of the new approach is that there will be an in-between range for initiatives 
with broad support, also from consumers, which can be allowed” (R7).  
This element, “broad support” – and specifically the support from consumers – is a new concept in the 
prioritization policy of the ACM.  
Considerations regarding the consumer are not new in the decision-making of the ACM. In fact the 
consumer interest is understood as the core interest that the ACM defends and is a recurring element in the 
ACM documents and communication. The fact that these consumers do not constitute an organized group of 
citizens is why the ACM feels it is legitimized to act on their behalf. As one of the respondents said:  
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“You need an agency, because the [consumers] are not able to organize themselves to defend 
their interests” (R2).  
In relation to the Chicken of Tomorrow case, a respondent made this way of thinking concrete by stating that 
“there are many citizens who would rather have a cheap piece of chicken than an animal friendly piece of 
chicken. (…) Many people are more concerned with being able to buy any meat at all” (R10). It is exactly to 
those people for whom the price increase would have an impact on their choices, those people that are less 
organized, that the ACM feels it should be acting to ensure that such sustainability initiatives do not have 
excessive detrimental effects. 
In the new approach the ACM is less proactive in investigating cases. This more passive approach has 
consequences as regards the core purpose of the ACM of stepping in for consumers who are not organized 
themselves. The conflict is apparent in the answers given by respondents. One of the respondents described 
the new approach and related it to the conflict by qualifying the new approach as 
 “taking a step back, because we cannot continuously antagonize everybody. That means you 
have to rely on your connection with society, to make sure there is not someone saying: „You 
should be stricter‟. The people that probably would be saying that are the people on low 
incomes. That is the problem we have” (R2).  
Depending on explicit signals, such as a complaint that a certain initiative would be harmful, means that there is 
an increased chance that the ACM lets a detrimental agreement continue. Such complaints are unlikely to 
come from the unorganized consumers, so the ACM has to become reliant on other organizations. The ACM is 
not the only institution that has the goal of defending the consumer interests, but to give away some of its 
assertiveness creates an unsettling feeling with some of the respondents, one of whom said:  
“We are only going to start an investigation if someone squeals. But someone has to squeal. 
That could be the Consumers‟ Association, or maybe academics. But I am uneasy with the 
idea that we, as consumer and competition authority, might have to be a little bit more lenient 
or passive” (R2). 
Being less proactive is the response of the ACM to the desire of a less restrictive approach to sustainability 
initiatives from a competition policy perspective. A justification for this approach is given by explaining the 
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exceptional aspects of these initiatives, in comparison to more traditional competition cases. One of the 
respondents said:  
“Normally we investigate cases – cartels – that take place in back rooms. What you see with 
these types of cases is that they are being peddled in public, both Energy and Chicken of 
Tomorrow. These are being publicized and everyone can form their opinion on it, also the 
people that don‟t agree. I think that means this approach indicates that we care about what 
happens in society, without side-lining ourselves” (R5).  
The public nature of sustainability initiatives gives the ACM some degree of assurance that society as a whole 
and consumers specifically can evaluate and judge the merits of the initiative. If the balance is in favour of the 
sustainability initiative, the ACM will have rightly let the initiative continue. If consumers do not value the 
sustainable positives high enough to justify the detrimental effects on competition parameters, the ACM 
supposes that this will become apparent in the way of a complaint or in some other form. 
By taking this approach the ACM relies on the idea that the consumers, who are otherwise considered 
unlikely to evaluate such agreements and voice their opinion, will be able to have their voice heard at the ACM. 
The respondents have indicated that this role is one which has to be carefully maintained. One respondent 
said:  
“I think there is always room for improvement in our connection to the outside world. Every day 
we look outside from the viewpoint of one particular mission, and however important that 
mission is, it brings along the risk that you lose sight of the other viewpoints” (R7).  
This connection to the outside world can be found in the citizenship of the ACM employees according to one of 
the respondents, who said:  
“I think we have enough connection with outside society to identify the consumer interests. 
(…) We are all part of society ourselves as well. We see what happens around us. It‟s not like 
we are sitting in an ivory tower, only concerned with ourselves - on the contrary. We are all 
citizens, have family in hospital, experience the same concerns and views. That experience 
alone gives the connection with society. We are all active citizens reading the newspapers and 
watching television” (R11).  
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Being open to outside opinions does introduce a new element to the discussion of taking into account public 
interests by the competition authority. Although the sustainability initiatives are made public, this does not 
necessarily mean that the benefits outweigh the detrimental effects. Moreover, the public interest that is being 
claimed by parties might be not much more than a façade for creating goodwill for uncompetitive behaviour. 
The respondents are aware of this risk, and one of them said:  
“I think it is very important that the ACM listens to society. It is a reality that the ACM must 
listen and keep into account [what it hears]. However, then, especially then, is when you have 
to be careful as well, as a competition authority. Because who decides what is a public 
interest? Everyone can claim he is acting for a public interest” (R1).  
The evaluation of what is a public interest is not one that the ACM feels it is competent to make. To do this it is 
possible to look at other public organizations or politics, as one of the respondents explained:  
“We don‟t pretend to be able to judge and balance all interests. Therefore we always try to 
involve an authoritative source, a sponsor, to endorse the validity of the public interest. That 
could be the Social and Economic Council or a Ministry” (R7).  
The ultimate legitimation of the value of a public interest lies in the democratically legitimized process. Placing 
this responsibility outside the remit of the competition authority, the role of politicians in the issue of 
sustainability and competition becomes clearer. ACM does not have a mandate for balancing all possible public 
interests, which democratically elected institutions have, according to one of the respondents:  
“When we look at a case and ask whether the behaviour is desirable, parties are quick to 
claim that they are acting on behalf of a certain public interest. They claim everybody values 
that public interest and therefore we should let them continue, regardless of restrictions of 
competition [that may ensue]. But to us, that public interest has not been made clear. That is 
why we often say that the government should make very clear what it is that they stand for and 
what are the sacrifices they are willing to make for it. If that is legitimized through the public 
process – the legislature or some other political body – it is possible to make all kinds of trade-
offs” (R9).  
As political bodies are well-suited to making these decisions, what is left for the ACM is to be responsive to the 
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outcome of the public process.  
The new approach towards sustainability initiatives, as described in the commitments in the letter from 
the Minister, is the outcome of the responsiveness to the politically legitimized desire for a different relationship 
between competition and sustainability. Only when this political wish is formalized to some degree can the 
ACM commit to a change in its procedures, according to a respondent who said: 
 “We have agreed to do some more explanation to the public and in the future we won‟t start 
these investigations on our own initiative anymore, like we did with Chicken of Tomorrow. That 
has to do with the fact that the Minister wants to create new legislation. That gives us 
legitimacy to take a step back. Apparently the policy makers‟ wish is to create more room in 
this issue” (R2).  
In the discussions concerning the intended changes to the Policy Rule, the ACM has stressed the need for a 
solution that was democratically legitimized, in the sense that it is laid down in legislation, and not an instruction 
for the ACM to take certain decisions. One of the respondents stated: 
 “Once it has that public legitimation, we won‟t touch it. (…) You can‟t make us responsible for 
such a decision. We don‟t have the legitimacy to do that. It‟s not a technocracy. It‟s a political 
decision that has to be left to politicians” (R11).  
The same idea is expressed by another respondent, who said: “We need the Ministry on our side, to have the 
political legitimacy” (R9). 
4.3 The dilemmas of responsiveness 
The detailed exposition of the case history enables the proposition of a more in-depth synthesis of this 
particular case and the theoretical framework of bureaucratic responsiveness as presented in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3. This synthesis will be structured along the lines of the central elements of the input dimension of 
responsiveness of the ACM: the regulatory space that is made up of political principals, interest groups, 
businesses, and other stakeholders; and the bureaucratic values and goals of the ACM, which invoke, among 
other things, professionalism, consumer welfare, and also sustainability interests. The responsiveness of the 
ACM towards these input elements can be evaluated across the developments presented in the case history 
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and across the elements of the output dimensions of responsiveness. These elements are, on the one hand, 
the different stages of decision-making (the formation of general policy, ACM‟s prioritization, the assessment of 
individual cases, and the external communication), and on the other hand the different degrees of 
responsiveness (agenda, symbolic, and impact responsiveness). The research shows that there are 
fundamental conflicts between several of the input elements. These result in competing ethical obligations of 
the ACM. This characterizes the dilemmatic nature of the responsiveness of the ACM as regards the issue of 
sustainability and competition.  
4.3.1 Responsiveness and the regulatory space 
Business 
In the early stages of the ACM dealing with the issue of sustainability a decisive consideration was generating 
more clarity for businesses that intended to undertake sustainability initiatives. This manifested itself in several 
stages of the decision making of the ACM. The drafting of the Vision Document can be explained as policy 
making. More meaningful was the prioritization of the two assessments presented in the case history and, 
especially, the external communication of the assessment methods. The new approach does not consist of any 
clearly defined criteria to judge the “broad support” for the initiatives. Building on the research by West (2004), 
this could be interpreted as a more flexible and informal approach to the issue, which creates more room for 
the competition authority to be responsive. On the other hand, this flexibility introduces an undeniable element 
of uncertainty for the businesses that might be planning such a sustainability initiative, which goes against the 
initial idea of dealing with the issue of sustainability vis-à-vis responding in an “entrepreneurial” manner to 
businesses as customers of the services of the ACM (Bryer, 2007). The conclusion is that initially the 
responsiveness of the ACM to the idea of providing certainty to businesses was indeed impactful, but this has 
to a considerable extent been undone by the more recent developments.   
Interest groups 
Responsiveness to interest groups has shown a dramatic shift in this case history. In the assessment of the two 
sustainability initiatives the role of interest groups has been extremely limited. Interest groups such as the 
animal welfare advocates and environmental organizations were not included in any of the steps taken by the 
ACM. The primary reason was the fact that they were not parties to the relevant aspects of the agreements and 
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as such were not considered to be official stakeholders. Although the ACM found an unexpected ally in the 
animal welfare organization Wakker Dier, the decision was made not to take advantage of this alignment. Two 
reasons are given. First, the underlying argument of Wakker Dier was not the same as the arguments for the 
assessment outcome of the ACM (R8). The second reason was the unpredictability of this alliance. The 
position of Wakker Dier was unexpected and unreliable. Leveraging the alignment as an alliance was perceived 
as a liability for the ACM in future cases (R6). In the new approach towards the prioritization of sustainability 
initiatives the ACM seems to have let go of this apprehension. As has been explained, the new approach 
assigns a significant role to actors that can represent broad societal interests. This role is likely to be fulfilled by 
interest groups. This warrants the conclusion that the impact responsiveness of the ACM towards interest 
groups has increased significantly.  
Parliament 
The role of parliament in this case history has been quite limited. The initial development of Vision Document 
was spurred by a parliamentary debate. Beyond this agenda responsiveness, the ACM has not shown much 
further responsiveness to parliamentary involvement with the issue. Moreover, respondents have indicated that 
the opinions of politicians are taken account of, but not substantively responded to. One reason that is given for 
this attitude is that the interests of these politicians are considered to be influenced by ulterior motives, “hidden 
agendas”, and partisanship. Indirectly, it could be argued, the role of parliament has been more substantial in 
this history because it has influenced the Minister‟s preoccupation with the issue, but the ACM has not shown 
much responsiveness directly to parliament. 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Responsiveness to the Ministry of Economic Affairs has, evidently, played a central role in the issue. With the 
announcement of a new approach towards the assessment of sustainability initiatives, the responsiveness in 
the formation of general policy has moved towards responsiveness to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The 
new approach of the ACM has announced the deprioritization of sustainability initiatives with broad support 
from consumers. This shows a significant response from the ACM to the insistence of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the most direct political principal of the ACM. Whether this responsiveness will result in the impact that 
the Ministry is looking for is up for debate. The desire is that more sustainability initiatives come into being. One 
of the ways in which they hope to achieve this, is by accomplishing that sustainability initiatives are approached 
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with more leniency, so that those initiatives are not thwarted by competition policy. Impact responsiveness 
would in this context occur if the new approach does indeed lead to more sustainability initiatives, or at least 
fewer initiatives that are halted. The question that remains to be answered is whether this will be the outcome 
of the new approach, especially considering the increased uncertainty that the new approach introduces.  
European Commission 
The role of the European Commission in the issue of sustainability and competition has been substantial. This, 
however, was mostly directed towards the Ministry of Economic Affairs. That is not to say that there is no 
relationship between the ACM and the European Commission. The opinion of the European Commission 
regarding the policy and assessment of sustainability initiatives has been very comparable to the approach of 
the ACM. That this would constitute a responsiveness of the ACM to the European Commission is dismissed 
by the respondents. Their characterization is that the similarity can be attributed to the correspondence of more 
fundamental professional values and goals that stem from their common interpretation of competition theory 
and practice. Indirectly, the position of the European Commission on this issue has influenced the dynamics 
between the ACM and the Ministry. These dynamics and the symbiosis between the professional values of the 
ACM and the relationship with the European Commission will be discussed further below. 
Fellow competition authorities 
Whereas the competition experts at the European Commission played a significant part in several of the events 
surrounding the assessment of sustainability initiatives, there was a total lack of recognition with fellow 
competition authorities. The ACM has raised the issue of sustainability and competition in the two networks of 
competition authorities in which it participates, the International Competition Network (ICN) and the European 
Competition Network (ECN), but in both settings were confronted with the absence of similar issues in other 
countries. As such, there is no argument to be made that the ACM has shown responsiveness to such 
networks.  
4.3.2 Responsiveness and professional and bureaucratic values and goals 
Up to this point the mechanistic evaluation of responsiveness to different stakeholders has addressed the issue 
of sustainability and competition and responsiveness to the related interests as a relatively straight-forward and 
unproblematic development. This does not do justice to the dilemmas of responsiveness that have come to the 
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forefront in the interviews with ACM staff. To illustrate these dilemmas it is necessary to introduce those input 
elements of responsiveness that pertain not to material stakeholders, but to the goals and values as 
professional bureaucrats of the people that work at the competition authority. By looking at the combinations 
and conflicts of different ethical perspectives with different goals and interests, the dilemmas that play a role 
become apparent and, finally, a comprehensive picture of the character of responsiveness towards the issue of 
sustainability and competition can be reached.   
Professionalism and independence 
Professionalism and independence go hand in hand. In the assessment of the individual cases the ACM has 
chosen for professional values and a purely technical approach instead of responsiveness to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. The outcomes of these assessments have strengthened the feeling of independence within 
the ACM, from which it can be learned that the independence is primarily understood as independence from 
their political principal. Research into stakeholder influence on autonomous agencies has shown that Dutch 
agencies perceive their parent minister as the primary principal (Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2011). In the present 
research we have seen that ties with the European Commission can play an important role in the relationship 
with the parent minister. In its technical approach, the ACM has found support from the European Commission. 
Many of the respondents confirm that the ACM found strong support in the European Commission. The 
relationship between the ACM and the European Commission is different from that between the Ministry and 
the European Commission, as was explained by a respondent:  
“The ACM regularly consults with the European Commission on the cases we encounter. The 
Ministry is less inclined to consult with Brussels, because the Ministry knows that [the 
European Commission] like[s] to put an „additional splash of free market‟ on top of everything” 
(R9).  
The support from the European Commission strengthens the ACM‟s position in relation to the Ministry, but it is 
also in itself worth pursuing, said a respondent:  
“We like to stay close to the Commission as long as there is no case law that states differently. 
Of course you can choose to stick your neck out, and that is certainly a possibility, but until 
now we have not felt the need to take a step beyond what the Commission would support” 
52 
 
(R11).  
Independence from the Ministry is apparently strongly valued by the ACM, but to retain this independence the 
ACM leverages the support from the European Commission. The result is that the independence towards one 
political actor, the Ministry, necessitates dependence on the other political actor, the European Commission. 
This reliance on the European Commission does complicate things further for the ACM, because it gives rise to 
an image of “Brussels” stepping in and forbidding national efforts (R9).  
The lack of responsiveness of the ACM to the wishes of the Ministry in the assessment of the 
sustainability initiatives can be ascribed to the independence of the ACM, but in a peculiar way also to the 
dependence on the European Commission. With the new approach the ACM has shown responsiveness 
towards the Ministry, which to some extent can be considered as a lessening of this independence. How this 
alters the relationship with the European Commission remains to be seen. This illustrates the dilemma of 
responsiveness to political principals with unaligned interests, particularly when the independence of the 
competition authority might come to be questioned. 
Professionalism and openness 
Responsive communication towards the intended consumer constituency is considered to be a requirement for 
the possible acceptance of non-electoral representation (van Veen, 2014, p. 230). The ACM phrases this 
attribute as its core value of “openness” (ACM, 2014a). Openness as a bureaucratic value introduces certain 
dilemmas when it concerns responsiveness from the ACM. The responsiveness of the ACM in its external 
communication has served symbolic as well as substantive purposes. The symbolic purpose of responsiveness 
in the external communication is to explain and justify the decisions made by the ACM to society. One of the 
goals of both assessments was to give more thorough guidance to businesses for their self-assessment. It is 
an example of responsiveness in communication that serves as more than symbolic responsiveness. However, 
this responsiveness has had implications that went beyond the external communication: to give guidance to 
businesses it was felt necessary to do a more detailed analysis than dictated by the specifics of the case. The 
communication after the assessment of the Energy Agreement and the Chicken of Tomorrow was focused on 
explaining the technical aspects of the competition assessment. This has had negative effects on the 
communicative aspects of the case. One of the respondents explained that in the Chicken of Tomorrow case 
this explicit choice in the method of assessment had effects on the reception by the public:  
53 
 
“We tried very hard to do a very thorough analysis, but I think we [sort of] shot ourselves in the 
foot. We analysed it in such a way that people were able to ridicule it and make it absurd. And 
actually we didn‟t even really need that deep analysis, but we chose to do it the hard way 
because we thought that would give more guidance” (R9).  
The sustainability issue has raised awareness within the ACM that a technically sound analysis has to be 
complemented with appropriate communication to the broader public. The controversy after both the individual 
case assessments has helped the ACM in achieving a more appropriate way of communicating. The 
respondents confirmed this impression, one of whom stated:  
“You can see that we have become more at ease with dealing with sustainability and the 
balance of interests that is involved. It remains a complicated issue, but I find we have a more 
coherent notion of how the ACM can, and must, deal with these societal concerns” (R6).  
Another respondent said:  
“We thought we could do the debate a favour by showing how you can do such an 
assessment. Yes, it has provoked a lot of discussion, but it has also given much insight into 
what is useful and what is not. As an investment in the quality of the debate I think it has been 
a good move” (R11). 
The desire of the ACM to be open and communicative is in conflict with its adherence to the highly 
technical professional norms of the competition assessment. The lesson that has been learned from 
the assessment of the two sustainability initiatives is that responsiveness guided by these two variants 
of responsiveness - constrained responses to the technical rules and procedures or purposive 
responses to the administrator-defined goal of openness – results in a dilemma. Initially the emphasis 
was on the communication of the technicalities of the assessment, but responsiveness has shifted the 
emphasis towards the more symbolic function of communication as a tool for establishing the 
constituency‟s acceptance of the ACM‟s non-electoral representation.   
Consumer welfare and sustainability 
During the assessment of individual cases we have seen that the values of professionalism have been the 
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most influential guide for the behaviour of the ACM. The professional values of the ACM have often led to 
conflicts with the wishes of political principals. In extremis, the professional values and the strong insistence on 
a strict interpretation of competition policy have resulted in a feeling of being bound to certain decisions and 
actions that clash with more personal sentiments that are informed by a distinct social awareness.  
The goal of competition policy is to protect and promote consumer welfare. As administrator of 
competition policy, it is self-evident that considerations of consumer welfare guide the actions of the ACM 
throughout the case history. The initial stages of addressing the sustainability issue, as evidenced by the Vision 
Document, did not constitute any form of responsiveness to consumer welfare per se. Consumer welfare in 
competition policy is dictated by economic terms. The consumer‟s interest is considered to be represented 
when the price that is paid for the goods that are desired is at its lowest. The ACM has therefore made use of 
economic methods to assess the sustainability initiatives. The confidence in using economics as the analytical 
tool for a diverse range of issues is high. One of the respondents explained: 
“In principle, you can label everything as an economic interest. (…) Economics is useful, 
because it can also be used to examine all kinds of soft factors that people value. (…) I don‟t 
agree with the criticism that the ACM has approached the issue from a too narrow economic 
perspective” (R4). 
But the same respondent also acknowledged that  
“I think it is appropriate to practice some caution. After all, it is in theory possible to take into 
account all the interests, but in practice it is often difficult to weigh them correctly” (R4). 
This weighing, or balancing of different interests is a recurrent theme for the respondents. It results in a very 
fundamental dilemma for the competition authority when public interests come into play in the competition 
assessments. Despite being convinced of the correctness of the economic approach, there are circumstances 
where it is better to let it go. One of the respondents made this point very clear, by taking some of the 
arguments to the extreme: 
 “What is the point of being right, when nobody agrees with you or if everybody thinks you are 
completely crazy? (…) You can be right, without being reasonable: „The polar ice caps are 
melting, but it is good for competition‟. On the other hand, you can‟t say: „Anything goes, 
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because otherwise the ice caps will melt‟. And sometimes, [the competition authority] is just 
not the one to make the judgement. Just imagine a case where ritual slaughter is only possible 
under a cartel agreement. Are we then supposed to give precedence to freedom of religion 
over competition rules? Or the other way round? It would be quite something if [the Board of 
the ACM] would have to make that judgement” (R5). 
The ACM staff are painfully aware of the absurdity that could come out of the purely technical approach to 
some of the issues at hand with competition and public interests. If they would always act only on the basis of 
this constrained responsiveness, their credibility and legitimacy would be undermined. Therefore, their method 
of assessing sustainability initiatives must be complemented with a more social element that lends legitimacy to 
whatever outcome might result. The new approach towards the prioritization of sustainability initiatives shows a 
different view on representing the consumer interest. Whereas earlier the ACM was exclusively focused on the 
economic terms of consumer welfare, now the consumer interest is to be represented in a more corporeal form. 
In the actual assessment of sustainability initiatives the reliance on economics remains unchanged.  
In the first period of the ACM‟s existence, it showed responsiveness to the wish of addressing the issue 
of sustainability and competition, by formulating general policy and guidelines. However, the views put forward 
in these documents do not constitute a substantively different understanding of competition policy by the ACM, 
but rather an elaboration and elucidation of their existing interpretation. In the assessment of the individual 
cases the actual output of the competition authority can still not be interpreted as responsive to the political and 
societal calls for a different appraisal of the sustainability interests. With the new approach of deprioritizing 
sustainability initiatives the ACM has certainly shown responsiveness, but whether this will result in actual 
impact responsiveness or prove to be merely symbolic is debatable.  
The announced new approach to sustainability initiatives imposes increased demands on the outward 
accountability of the ACM to the public. Defining or measuring “broad public support” of sustainability initiatives 
will be a daunting task for the competition authority. The respondents have indicated that they feel they are 
able to perform this task on the basis of their inherent connection with society. Their reasoning is comparable 
with Kearny and Sinha‟s (1988) arguments in favour of the professional bureaucrat, stating that the 
heterogeneity and citizenship of professional bureaucrats is sufficient for the alignment of bureaucratic values 
and behaviour with the public interest.  
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The ACM has stressed that any substantively new policy would need clear and formalized democratic 
legitimization through a public and political process. As an independent regulatory authority, the ACM draws on 
its independence, accountability and competence as sources of legitimacy. The competence of the ACM lies in 
the highly formalized and technical domain of competition theory. With the new approach, the ACM appeals to 
considerations that are removed from this domain. The consequence could be that by shifting the emphasis 
away from competence as a source of legitimacy leads to a legitimacy deficit. This would put a burden on the 
other sources of legitimacy, accountability and independence, to compensate the deficit. However, between 
accountability and independence there is an inherent tension that is difficult to resolve.  
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5 Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of the results 
This study set out to investigate the way in which the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) 
has been responsive to the tensions between sustainable development and competition policy. A review of the 
literature on responsiveness, particularly of the bureaucracy, and the legitimacy of independent regulatory 
authorities has indicated that the study of responsiveness must incorporate a diverse set of features and 
perspectives. The elements of responsiveness have been arranged along the input dimension, to what is 
responded, and the output dimension, in what form is responded. The responsiveness of the ACM brings along 
multiple stakeholders and several conflicting interests, which together make up the input dimension. The output 
dimension of responsiveness refers to the stage of decision-making in which responsiveness is shown and the 
degree of responsiveness. By conducting interviews with employees, directors and board members of the 
ACM, this study has brought to light the considerations, motivations, and choices made by the ACM regarding 
responsiveness to the different stakeholders and interests. The results of this study can be reformulated into 
three themes of responsiveness, each of which contains one or more dilemmas in the practicing of 
responsiveness by the competition authority, which have been the driving forces behind the actions of the 
ACM. 
Being open and professional: guidance and clarity in communication 
The origins of the discussion about the (in)compatibility of competition policy and sustainability initiatives can 
be traced to the creation of the Vision Document Sustainability & Competition and the assessment of two 
individual cases: the Energy Agreement and the Chicken of Tomorrow case. There was a perceived need for 
clarity about the way competition policy works with regard to sustainability initiatives. The goal of the Vision 
Document and the case assessments was to give guidance. This can be seen as responsiveness by the ACM 
in two areas of its activities: in its prioritization (the decision to investigate the cases) and in its external 
communication (by giving information in the Vision Document and by explaining the outcome of the 
assessments). In the communication of the cases, the ACM has focused on explaining the technicalities of the 
assessment. This has resulted in a negative image of the ACM by outsiders who considered the approach of 
the ACM to be too narrowly focused on economics. This dilemma has produced the need for the ACM to strike 
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a balance between its goals of providing guidance and clarity for businesses, staying true to its professional 
norms of the economic assessment of competition casesBeing professional and independent: one political 
principal is not like the other 
In the assessment of the cases the emphasis has been on technical aspects and maintaining the highest 
professional standards. The outcome of both cases was that the sustainability initiatives could not be approved. 
The awareness that this outcome was undesirable to politicians and the Ministry of Economic Affairs has led to 
some internal discussion on the appropriate approach to the assessment of such cases. However, in the end 
these political considerations have consistently been overruled by values of professionalism. The Minister of 
Economic Affairs is the direct political principal of the ACM, but institutionally the ACM is an independent 
administrative body. Independence from the Ministry is valued highly by the ACM. The outcome of the case 
assessments is seen by several of the respondents as a sign of independence. 
There is a willingness to be responsive to the desire of society to stimulate sustainability initiatives, but 
the ACM feels constrained by their mandate of assessing such initiatives on purely technical considerations. 
The mandate originates from a political principal and ultimately any substantive change of the approach to the 
assessment of sustainability initiatives has to come about in a formal procedure through a democratically 
legitimized political body. The ACM has found support with the European Commission for the case 
assessments. This support has been used as leverage to strengthen the position of the ACM towards the 
Ministry. Responsiveness towards political principals can conflict with the adherence to the core value of 
independence of the ACM. However, it appears that the ACM is more concerned with independence from the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs than the European Commission. One of the reasons that the ACM has found 
support with the European Commission is their strict interpretation of competition policy. The Ministry is in 
favour of allowing leniency for sustainability initiatives. The ACM has announced a new approach that will 
deprioritize the investigation of sustainability initiatives, to avoid further conflict with the Ministry. This 
responsiveness of the ACM to the wishes of the Ministry could have consequences for the relationship that the 
ACM has with the European Commission. Future research on these developments could give valuable insight 
into the dynamics between the competition authority, national government, and the European Commission.  
Defending consumer welfare: sustainability and competition interests 
Consumers can be everybody and anybody, changing from product to product, market to market, and case to 
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case. This can make it difficult to identify a clearly defined and demarcated constituency to which the ACM 
feels it owes responsiveness. In the interviews it has become clear that to defend the interests of consumers, 
especially those consumers who do not have the capacity or resources to organize themselves, is felt like the 
most fundamental purpose of the ACM. When a sustainability initiative claims to serve the public interest, the 
ACM aims to investigate whether the initiative reaches that goal in an as efficient way as possible. If that is not 
the case, the ACM will put a halt to the initiative on the grounds that it is not in the interest of consumers. This 
conflict of competition interests and sustainability interests sits uncomfortably with the respondents. They feel 
that they are not legitimized to weigh such fundamental interests against each other. However, they are forced 
into this position by their legal mandate and professional norms. Ultimately, that means that the responsiveness 
of the ACM has prioritized competition interests over sustainability interests.  
The ACM justifies their knowledge of what is the consumer interest in two ways: their understanding of 
economic competition theory and their connection with society. In the new approach to sustainability initiatives, 
ACM will not prioritize sustainability initiatives which have broad public support and support from consumers. 
This showcases a shift from constrained responsiveness to the rules of economic competition analysis to a 
more purposive responsiveness to the representational functioning of the competition authority. Because 
consumers are generally not organized to voice their support or lack of support, the ACM will rely on its 
connection with society more than ever. How this will be done exactly remains unclear. Maintaining legitimacy 
for competition policy enforcement might prove to be a challenging task ahead for the ACM, but it has become 
clear that responsiveness to the public will play an important role in any activities related to the assessment of 
sustainability initiatives.  
5.2 Limitations and future research 
The research topic of this study has been addressed by undertaking a single case study. One of the limitations 
of this approach is that there is limited external validity. The results that have been produced are very specific 
to the particular cases that the ACM has come across and specific to the Dutch socio-political context (e.g. the 
“polder model”). Respondents have indicated that the problems the ACM has faced are unique to the 
Netherlands and have not been encountered to the same extent by other competition authorities. Future 
research could address this limited external validity by involving other cases, with other competition authorities 
in other countries, possibly resulting in a comparative analysis of the issue.  
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The interviews that were done with eleven staff of the ACM are the primary source of empirical data for 
this study. Although they offered a rich and detailed set of observations, some limitations are inherent to 
interviews as a source of data. The research topic included events that occurred up to three years earlier, so 
there is a distinct possibility that the memory of the respondents was not flawless. To mitigate this problem the 
interview data was supported with other sources (documents) to ensure the internal validity of the results. A 
true longitudinal study to capture the dynamic nature of the responsiveness was not feasible in this case, but 
could be valuable for further research in this field. Another limitation of the reliance on interviews is that the 
selection of respondents was limited to staff of the ACM, introducing a possible element of bias. Moreover, the 
fact that the research was done by a single researcher, who was himself an intern at the ACM for six months 
prior to the research, is a source of potential bias. On the other hand, this particular experience of the 
researcher was probably beneficial to achieving a high degree of candour from the respondents. 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
In this study of the responsiveness of the national competition authority of the Netherlands we have seen 
how the approach to the assessment of sustainability initiatives under competition policy has developed. The 
themes of responsiveness that have been presented in this study illustrate the tensions and dilemmas the 
competition authority faces as regards this particular issue. Within the ACM there is a prevailing sentiment that 
it requires more political legitimization to address the issue. Collaborative arrangements and citizen 
participation have been suggested as alternative solutions in these scenarios where competing ethical 
perspectives and obligations challenge the fruitfulness of responsiveness (Bryer, 2007; Vigoda, 2002). There 
are still many uncertainties as to how this could effectively fill the gap between the independent authority and 
the citizen to properly provide the democratic legitimacy sought for. The present study has shown that rather 
than introducing collaboration and negotiation in the substantive assessment of sustainability initiatives, the 
ACM is inclined to incorporate responsiveness in the prior stage of prioritization. However, the effect is that the 
ACM is taking a step back, rather than participating in collaborative arrangements of engagement with its 
stakeholders. 
The issue of sustainability and competition has not (yet) received much attention outside the field of legal 
scholarship. An exception is the work of Gerbrandy (2015a), which addresses the “legitimacy problem” and 
proposes a solution consisting of more direct democratic participation of citizens in a deliberative process in the 
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form of stakeholder panels. The idea is intriguing, but in its elaboration tensions become apparent with 
fundamental aspects of the competition authority, such as its expertise in competition theory and its 
independence. If the competition authority continues to rely on its expertise and values of professionalism as 
the leading principles for decision-making, the role of responsiveness in this process might be confined to 
symbolic responsiveness. Another problem with the solution of citizen participation is how this participation 
might be organized. Obvious stakeholders are businesses and consumers. Research has signalled that the 
absence of actual citizen participation and the predominance of business interests can be expected. The risk of 
regulatory capture looms (Braun, 2015; Golden, 1998; Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003). How to 
balance participation and independence? Who can represent such a dynamic notion as the “consumer 
interest”? What role is there, if any, for sustainability interest groups and business interests? Unfortunately the 
respondents of the present study did not have answers to these questions. The intention of the ACM to 
incorporate responsiveness to society‟s sustainability interests has manifested itself as a curtailing of its 
investigative discretion as competition authority. As a result, the preliminary substantive assessment of 
sustainability initiatives has become to some extent the responsibility of undefined actors – but not the ACM – 
that represent “broad societal support” and “the consumer interest”. Aforementioned questions seem, therefore, 
more pressing than ever, particularly for the possible success of a more collaborative approach to the issue of 
sustainability and competition. 
Responsiveness is an essential element of any legitimate democracy. In the context of the “democratic 
deficit” of the European Union it is considered to be the key to legitimacy (Moravcsik, 2002; Follesdal & Hix, 
2006). The predominance of regulatory networks and independent regulatory authorities at the national and the 
European level has made the need for responsiveness even more urgent (Føllesdal, 2011). But, these new 
modes of government also make the realization of responsiveness more problematic. The tension between the 
European Commission and the national political actors that has been illustrated in the present study has made 
precarious the responsiveness of the ACM. There is a clear conflict of interests with independence, 
accountability, professionalism, and legitimacy. Increased responsiveness might be the solution, but it could 
equally be presented as part of the problem. Showing responsiveness requires balancing conflicting ethical 
obligations and taking into account many competing interests. As long as it is felt that political legitimization is 
insufficient to perform this delicate task, it will remain a complicated and multifaceted endeavour for the national 
competition authority. 
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Appendix B – Interview guide 
 What is your function at ACM? 
 Can you describe your involvement with the topic of sustainability and competition? 
 How and why was the Vision Document Competition & Sustainability developed? 
o Was there involvement by the Ministry / European Commission? 
o Has there been any involvement or response from members of parliament / interest groups / 
lawyers / academics / international fellow competition authorities? 
 How were you involved in the cases Energy Agreement / Chicken of Tomorrow? 
o What were the reasons to investigate the case (prioritization)? 
o Can you describe the approach to the assessment of the case? 
o Has there been discussion within the ACM about the approach to the assessment? 
o How would you describe the external communication of the case? 
o How have you experienced the discussion outside of the ACM after the case assessment? 
Has it influenced the decision-making? 
o How has the Ministry of Economic Affairs been involved in the case? 
o How have you experienced this? Has it influenced the decision-making? 
o How has the European Commission been involved in the case? Has it influenced the 
decision-making? 
o Has the European Commission‟s position been perceived as support? 
Has there been any involvement or response from members of parliament / interest groups / 
lawyers / international fellow competition authorities? Has it influenced the decision-making? 
 Can you describe the new approach to the assessment of sustainability initiatives? 
o Was there involvement by the Ministry / European Commission? Has it influenced the 
decision-making? 
o Has there been any involvement or response from members of parliament / interest groups / 
lawyers / academics / international fellow competition authorities? Has it influenced the 
decision-making? 
 How do you handle the conflict between different public interests? 
 Have you experienced difficulty in staying true to the ACM values of independence, professionalism, 
and openness? 
 
